He Got An-hillee-eight-ed

Unfogged makes fun of Matt Yglesias’ spelling.

I used to have the opposite problem as a teenager: I read constantly but I had no idea how most of the words I was reading were actually pronounced, since they weren’t often said around me. But I kept wanting to use the words to see whether I understood them. An-hillee-eight-ed, knave for “naive”, and so on. I still occasionally drop into an obsfuscating mumble if I’m using a word that I haven’t heard pronounced that often, or a name that I’m deeply concerned I don’t know how to say properly. Old habit.

Posted in Miscellany | 10 Comments

Geekout

Some things that are on my geeky mind:

1) Avatar is just damned amazingly good. Kid-equipped people should be making it preferential viewing. Non-kid people should also consider watching. The episode that really convinced me it was the kind of kidvid that my brother and Kevin were calling for in Saturday Morning Fever was the one where the title character convinced two warring tribes that their mythological narratives of ethnic conflict are in error, because he was around a century before when their conflict supposedly started. After he’s convinced them that they’ve mistaken a children’s sporting match for a huge primal cultural conflict, the two tribes make nice and wander off together happily. The protagonist sighs and turns to his two close friends. They express amazement that he happened to be there a century before and that the story was so simple to resolve. The Avatar laughs: he lied, just to get the two groups to stop being so stupid.

I fell in love right at that moment: it’s exactly what would never have happened in 1970s era kidvid but also what doesn’t happen in ironic self-referential kidvid either. The show is marvelously moral and yet also incredibly entertaining and wise at the same moment. First-rate stuff.

2) I’m almost done with superhero comics. That’s an amazing thing for me to say. There’s a few that I still enjoy, but largely only as trade paperbacks (Geoff Johns on Flash, Bendis on Powers). I was afraid about Identity Crisis a while back and I think my anxiety turns out to be well-warranted.

Superhero comics are serial drama, and the desire to consume them turns on parallel forms of arrested development involved in the consumption of soap operas. I’m not at all apologetic about those preferences. However, doing it right is a real trick: a good creator of serial drama has to both satisfy the consumer desire for more of the same while also delivering the impression of something new. I’ve written in the past about how the inability of the owners of the contemporary mainstream superhero universes to allow their metafictions to develop a more consistently imaginative foundation or backdrop has undercut the storytelling capacities of their creators.

Nothing’s changed as far as that goes, but the major remaining strength of both DC and Marvel, the nostalgic investments that long-time readers have with characters, is being steadily eroded. This is the same thing that brings soap opera viewers back from temporary disaffections with particular storylines or phases of their favorite shows: once the creative team moves on, the characters are still there, the mood of the genre form is still there. The genius of the core fiction behind a character like Batman is still there, a trusty if somewhat antiquated engine capable of churning out new narratives. A writer can even mess with some aspects of that core fiction to good end, but the anchor is still there as a last-instance guarantee of the reader’s pleasure.

But there’s a kind of malign spirit gripping both companies at the moment: stories that aren’t just mean and grubby in their narratives, but which backwash that sense into the characters and their anchoring mythologies. There are a lot of recent examples: the gratitutious unpleasantries of the “Disassembling” of the Avengers (and the crassness of a “New Avengers” that includes the most overexposed character in the history of the comics, Wolverine), but the worst I think I’ve seen lately is Batman #644. I read through it in the comic store rather than buy it: it’s almost finished my interest in reading standard-form superhero comics, at a time when I’m down to only one or two titles already. In it, the character of Dr. Leslie Thompkins, a long-time fixture in the comics, the character whose anchoring morality was an important part of the development of Batman’s origins, is consigned to the dust heap, as DC decided to make her a murderer out to end superheroic activity. Whatever. It’s more than a stupid story: it’s a kind of throwing water on the embers of an almost-dead fire. In the end, the main thing I ask of the intrinsic silliness of mainstream superhero titles is that they still be fun to read. Most of them aren’t fun any longer, but they’re still not about real people in real situations or even fantastically real people in fantastically real situations, so what’s left? Very little, at least for me.

Posted in Popular Culture | 9 Comments

The Comfort of Being Irrelevant

I had a chance to listen last night to an extremely interesting talk by Brendan O’Leary, who has been part of a consulting team (that included Karol Soltan) advising authorities in Kurdistan about the constitutional negotiations in Iraq.

O’Leary is the kind of political scientist that arouses my envy and my admiration but also the faint chimes of a historian’s skepticism. The combination of pragmatism, clarity, deep knowledge of places and situations, the muscular language of action and decision, the actual engagement with power as it is and might be, all of that present so attractively in the way a scholar like O’Leary presents the issues involved in a place like Iraq. Listening to it, so much of the weary weight of endless epistemological and entirely academic spats melts away, so many Gordian knots seem to fall to the floor sliced in two. It’s a break from counting various angels on the heads of various pins.

Don’t get me wrong: I’ve heard similarly forceful presentations by political scientists or other experts who’ve been off consulting in some part of the world that I’ve reacted to with primal antipathy. I’ve never forgotten the talk I heard at Emory many moons ago by a noted political scientist who shall go nameless about consulting work he’d been doing on ethnic violence in various countries. Among his recommendations: raise the voting age in African nations to 30 because young men were usually the ones involved in ethnic conflict and make sure that police forces in Eastern Europe had bicycles so they could get to the scene of violent assaults against gypsies more rapidly. (Why? I remember thinking. So the police don’t miss out on their chance to join in the beatings?)

O’Leary impressed me in part because there was none of that kind of nonsense in his presentation or his posture towards the kind of work he does. If I felt the vague stirrings of historical and anthropological skepticism, it was in part simply because I have an inclination to believe that things can’t possibly be as clear as O’Leary portrays them (not that his views were simplistic or that his representation of the situation in Iraq is without complexity and depth), and because I can’t believe that electoral politics, constitution-making, party formation, formal negotiations and so on are actually where the real motors and mechanisms determing the future of Iraq or any society lie. It seems to me that all that is often a kind of baroque surfacing over deeper kinds of social structures. To consult with a government in good faith, I suppose you have to believe that government officials have choices that meaningfully affect general social outcomes, that formal negotiations can be transparent to results. A historian, looking more diffidently, with an indolent disengagement from the possibility of intervening in events, tends to see a lot of situations where negotiations were just another kind of Potemkin front lining a deeper stream of causality. But O’Leary’s views aren’t modular or transportable: he’s not doing what at least one Africanist political scientist does, trying to offer a one-stop shopping trip 12-step method for creating peace accords in all civil conflicts. What he’s offering is a very specific, very rooted reading of this particular political moment in Iraq.

The most startling, persuasive and unsettling thing I heard in his reading of the situation is that it doesn’t really matter what the United States does at this point, that both the positive and negative outcomes that O’Leary sees as being possible in the next year are not dependent on how the US participates in the negotiating process. (All of the scenarios that O’Leary described do depend on the continued presence of US troops until the conclusion of the constitutional referendum and subsequent elections, though.) The only thing O’Leary thought could change the situation entirely (for the worse) would be if the US ramped up its aggressive posture on Iran’s nuclear policy.

Considering that the one thing many of us who have been critical of the US’s management of the occupation have focused on is the alleged managerial incompetence of the United States, it’s definitely challenging to consider the possibility that from here on out, whether or not the US is incompetent on the ground in Iraq may be completely unimportant in shaping the long-term outcome in Iraq itself. In fact, though he didn’t say this, it even implies that past incompetence has been irrelevant.

It seems to me that US conduct in Iraq might still matter in determining the impact of the entire escapade on the US’s larger ability to shape events elsewhere in the world, that there might be general consequences not restricted to Iraq. But still, it’s a sobering thought that the kinds of errors, misconduct, mismanagement and incompetence that have fueled a lot of my own criticism of the war might basically be irrelevant even in the short-term political future in Iraq, let alone the long-term future. My historian’s skepticism kicks in again a bit there, that what happens in political negotiations is one thing, and what happens at the level of everyday consciousness another, that how Kurds, Shi’a and Sunni in Iraq feel about themselves, their communities, the world and the United States might yet be as important a long-term issue as whether Iraq has three provinces or five.

Nevertheless, it’s useful cold water poured over the heads of both passionately anti-war and pro-war Americans: that perhaps what we do now doesn’t matter, that Iraqis have already seized the reins of sovereignity, and that the ability of pro-war neocons (or anti-war feminists) to dictate that particular desired liberal outcomes manifest in the constitution or society of Iraq is more or less nil.

Posted in Politics | 5 Comments

End of a Freelancer

I’ve been meaning for about a week to write about my friend Ben Yagoda’s Slate article in which he bids farewell to a freelance career.

I see a few bloggers couldn’t resist taking a dig at him for having another job as an academic. Reading comprehension, folks: it’s not like he sounds like Barbara Ehrenreich in the essay, whining about the cruelty of America or the direness of his circumstances. Snarking about the mere fact that somebody is an academic seems a favorite blood sport these days.

The essay does observe a couple of things that I thought were significant. One is that making a living off of freelance writing or even getting a regular dose of ego-gratification from it was once difficult, and now close to impossible. I remember in college having a copy of the Writer’s Market and leafing through it for all those little magazines and thinking about writing query letters. Even then, it was pretty clear that it would take a big dose of serendipidity, some networking and a lot of work quite aside from actually researching and writing articles in order to get published, let alone make any money at all from it. It’s pretty interesting that in between the beginning of his career as a freelancer and now, the payment for equivalent articles he’s written was the same: $500.00.

I do think weblogging has something to do with recent changes in the economics of writing. A lot of bloggers are giving away for free what might at an earlier time been done for money. Fewer would have been able to publish then what they write now. Some bloggers are hoping to break into the bigger time, with their blogs as loss-leaders, but most aren’t. That’s a challenge for freelancers, but also for the magazines that employ them. Getting people to buy a magazine (or even a book) means providing value that is distinctive and unavailable from free sources.

There are clearly “serious nonfiction” writers who publish in both magazines and who write books who are making a good living doing it, but I think at least some of them have other revenue streams, either from speaking engagements or being on the payroll of major publications. But were I a publisher, I’d worry a little about the atrophying of the rungs on the ladder just below that, and wonder if there wasn’t something that could be done to encourage freelancers and non-fiction writers who didn’t have huge contracts or steady gigs to stay in the game.

Posted in Blogging, Miscellany | 6 Comments

Diamond, Cultural Anthropology, Postcolonial Theory

Frederick Errington and Deborah Gewertz have made a series of interesting posts about Jared Diamond, “Yali’s Question” and Papua New Guinea at Savage Minds.

I agree with a number of comments I understand them to be making, particularly that Diamond’s obdurate materialism and macroscale analysis robs him of an appreciation of the ways in which commodities matter and determine social outcomes in a variety of historical and contemporary contexts because of what those commodities culturally and symbolically mean to individuals and societies as well as because of what their “real” material attributes might be. In their most recent post, they also observe something that I and others have noted in Diamond, which is a pretty serious confusion about necessary and sufficient causation.

However, at the same time, I think Gewertz and Errington’s basic antipathy to Diamond’s use of “Yali’s Question” is a fairly representative instance of recurrent problems in the epistemology of contemporary cultural anthropology and postcolonial theory (some of which practicioners are perfectly cognizant of, and in many cases grappling with). On a simple level, you could observe that it’s a kind of full-battery epistemological and methodological overreaction to what is in the end no more than a rhetorical device in Diamond’s book, that Diamond’s not altogether that interested in the empirical question of Yali’s life, or Yali’s understanding of his own question, just in using Yali as a framing device. I suppose some might regard that as a kind of problem of appropriation in its own regard, but if so, we might have to start going through ethnographic monographs to comb them for framing anecdotes which are not actually part of the substantive analysis of the monograph. I don’t have much patience for simple or crude assertions of “ownership” in this regard, that it is somehow wrong to use something like Yali’s Question anecdotally or rhetorically, because they’re never going to be meant to propose a serious methodological standard, just a kind of passing cheap shot against a soft target.

I don’t think that’s the real issue, however. There’s something more substantive at stake.

Diamond is faulted by Errington and Gewertz for provisioning a history which is the history that “we in the contemporary West already believe in”. Yali’s question, they suggest, ought to be understood instead in the contexts that Yali himself was produced by and within, the histories which generated him (and his question).

Three moves are made at once in the way they talk about Yali and his question, each one of them to me ultimately unsustainable and an example of a kind of epistemological constipation that cultural anthropology, postcolonial theory and cognate academic practices are presently suffering from. Here my observations echo some of the general critique made by Nicholas Thomas in his book Colonialism’s Culture, a work that I think deserves to be used much more widely as a methodological compass than it presently is.

The first is the compression of the heterogeneity of “the West” so that Diamond can be that which “we” in the West already believe in, rather than taking Diamond as an argument within a heterogenous assortment of intellectual presentations of the causality of world history, as located within highly particular intellectual histories and institutional worlds. In other words, they accord to Yali the importance of understanding him in context, but deny it in turn to Diamond; they object to the use of Yali as framing device but use Diamond in turn as a frame for “the West”, or a colonizing project, or in their most recent post, for widespread and highly generalized ideas and tropes impressionistically attributed to the “educated haves” (which is the kind a sociological shorthand that I suspect they would reject were something comparable used in an analysis of PNGuinea). The problem with this view is its synecdotal character: it is a kind of Tylorian view of “culture” turned back on the West. In this sort of argument, any part of “the West” can casually be made to stand in for the whole and to represent it, and by implication to carry the full force of some generalized colonizing or hegemonizing project inferred to the West.

Second, Yali is remanded to the sphere of the non-West, returned to being fully “PNGuinean” and his question removed out of the context of any specific dialogue or performance he might have had with particular Western individuals. It is made impossible that Yali might mean his question differently to different “Westerners” that he encountered, or have offered his question as one that he consciously or unconsciously understood to have meaning in more than one context. It is ruled out of bounds that Yali might have derived his question from the West, or out of an encounter with the West’s own capacity to ask the question, out of a history of relation. Or if that possibility is kept in the picture, it is a possibility that presupposes loss, degredation, contamination: that Yali would not have meant to appropriate his question from the West, but been made to do so. Contemporary anthropology well understands the problems posed by the old paradigm of non-Western societies as pristine entities contaminated by Western modernity: this is the source of the “multiple modernities” trope in so much recent scholarship. But the old paradigm persists as a kind of ghostly half-argument, a structure of reaction. So many of us like to talk about hybridities and negotiated colonialisms and multiple modernities, but not to accept the broad political or conceptual consequences of those interpretations. We keep them in check, offered as interpretative twists in the first half of what we write, disavowed by boilerplate in the second half. We know better than to clearly call for the unsoiling of history polluted by colonial encounter, but we drift into that dream nonetheless.

So Errington and Gewertz react to Diamond’s appropriation of Yali’s question by trying to place Yali safely back into a narrative of the non-West’s struggle for sovereignity, to make his question safely an expression of anger and frustration with the impositions of colonialism rather than an expression of avid desire for capitalist modernity, back into a history of nation formation and cultural recuperation, away from a history of incorporation and transformation. The problem is that Yali’s specific individual history ought to inhibit us from any such categorical moves, and instruct us that his question can be all these things at once: both reaching out for incorporation and resisting it, open to Diamond’s reading of it and yet also filled with surplus meaning that Diamond is completely insensate to. Yali can’t be easily remanded to being “PNGuinean”, in the gift world and not the commodity one when he asks his question, safely anticolonial and never promodernity. Accepting that he can be all at once, rejecting the imperative to always restore to Yali his PNGuinean-ness: that’s what it means to leave behind the sentimental narrative of history and ethnography as restitutive work, as knowledge which remands the non-West back to itself.

Here is where the third problem enters the picture, and it is the most devastating of all. It’s also the one that postcolonial theory and much cultural anthropology readily acknowledges, thinks about and indeed obsesses over, but nevertheless also often predictably reproduces in all its full problematic glory. Diamond is faulted for a history which is already that which the West believes in, which comforts the West’s own understanding of historical process and specifically comforts the “educated haves”, leaves them “feeling good about themselves”.

However, precisely the same thing could be said about the desire to understand Yali’s question “in its own context”, to offer an emic rather than etic account of Yali, PNGuinea, his question or anything else. That intellectual desire is just as much a history which the West already believes in, just as much a history which the West has long sought. If it is automatically a critique to observe this of Diamond, it is just as inevitably a critique of Gewertz and Errington, of the ethnographic imagination, of the aspiration of cultural anthropology to represent non-Western societies in the terms they would represent themselves in.

If you follow Gewertz and Errington’s presentation, Yali already understands his own question: he doesn’t need Gewertz and Errington to understand it. The non-West knows itself: it is not waiting for anthropology to provision that knowledge. The interpretation they suggest–indeed, make into a moral imperative–is just as much for and in the West if you concede their characterization of Diamond and of Yali. It is just as much a part of the history of the West’s history of itself as Diamond’s book is. And the desire to know the non-Western Other as it is presumed to know itself is just as native to the “educated haves” as they claim the desire for Diamond’s presentation is. It is just as much as a presentation sought for its aesthetic and political satisfactions, for its instructions of humility and self-abjection, just as much a retrospective metanarrative of modern history and a prospective reordering of the future.

But Errington and Gewertz want to fault Diamond for merely performing those functions, for being expressive of “the West” and appropriating Yali to satisfy audiences in the West. On that point alone, their interpretations are indistinguishable from his.

So either perhaps one could dispense with the shadowplay, and get to some political heart of the matter in which Errington and Gewertz (and many others) can acknowledge that this is not about whose knowledge is epistemologically preferable but about whose politics (intellectual and substantive) are righteous. If not, if this is really about knowledge of Yali, PNGuinea, non-Western societies, humanity, if the meat of the disagreement is still to be about epistemology, then the accusation that a particular way of knowing Yali originates out of and is instrumental to some audience or interest in the West is an immediate dead end.

This is at least one of the realizations which has occasioned the sometimes morbid circularity of some reflexive practices in cultural anthropology in the last decade and a half, the inability to get past the question of the situatedness of ethnographic knowledge to the actual knowing of ethnographic subjects. It’s behind the really radical epistemological lines in the sand drawn by thinkers like Gyan Prakash and Timothy Mitchell, the ruling out of bounds of the possibility of ever knowing the non-West at all precisely because it ought to be known in its own terms but that this aspiration to know it such is forever a profoundly logocentric and Western one. That to want to know the non-West as it knows itself is the most Western desire of all.

I think the way out of the hall of mirrors in part is to strip the arguments offered by Gewertz and Errington of their epistemological finery and their rhetorical adornments, to stop casually throwing so many gauntlets on the ground, to stop climbing atop certain kinds of moral pedestals. The critique of Diamond for his exclusionary disinterest in meaning, culture, expression, for the importance of the microhistorical and the particular, can be made exactly as such, as a fairly ordinary if important remark about what’s worth knowing. As the ordinary and humdrum business of history and anthropology. The critique of Diamond’s problems with understanding the difference between necessary and sufficient causation can be made similarly.

As for Yali, he doesn’t need white knights to come in and rescue him from the colonial villain, to restore his question to himself. His question is and always was his. And because Yali is not some distant Other, but a part of the world to which the “we” interested now in his question also belong, because we need to decompose our categorical representations of both the West and the Rest within modern experience, we don’t need an exotic, overheated epistemological machine to give ourselves permission to interpret his question. His question is also always ours, if we want it or find it useful. We might even concede to the “us” that writes and does scholarly work as many possible interpretations and uses of his question as Yali himself may well have had within his own consciousness, his own time, his own place–and not be constrained or embarrassed or compelled by any distance between Yali’s consciousness of his question and our own uses of it. Difference, whether temporal, spatial, circumstantial, between the people we study and the people we are is not in and of itself a moral or epistemological failure.

Posted in Academia, Books | 6 Comments

Passages

I’ve been meaning for a while to blog about Passages, which is a web-based revival of a publication started and maintained by my graduate advisor, David William Cohen. I helped put together one of the original issues in the early 1990s, so it’s a welcome sight for that reason alone.

The interesting thing about Passages was that it showed how much compelling “found material” was out there about Africa and the African diaspora just waiting to be drawn into a single location. My advisor was and remains a master at devising ways to magnetically redirect hidden or unremarked upon flows of documents, statements and materials into general visibility, to make apparent a transnational but also African public sphere that hums along unmarked and unnoticed in other global centers. I remember in particular how amazing the results were when he circulated a call for applications to an African Humanities Center at Northwestern. The call was printed in a unique format and mailed to many academic institutions in Africa; what came back in many cases were challenging, absorbing descriptions of quietly unpublished, ongoing work from intellectuals and scholars who had been patiently pursuing their inquiries despite a near-total lack of support from their own universities and often in difficult economic and political circumstances. The journal Transition, once published by Duke University Press and now (I think: the Nov. 2004 issue is still listed as “coming”) by Soft Skull Press, has often accomplished the same purpose, collecting surprising or idiosyncratic material from across the Africa diaspora.

In a way, Passages reminds me of my frustrations with blogging and the web, especially with sites like Slashdot or Boing Boing. Boing Boing’s main flaw is the speed of its information flow; Boing Boing’s strength is the speed of its information flow. The flawed side of that is visible as an amnesia. You can find old Boing Boing entries with the site’s own search function, or when you’re Googling something, but there really isn’t any kind of meaningfully useable archival character to Boing Boing, no accumulation of knowledge from the stream of information. (You can tell just how amnesiac Boing Boing is by the fact that the contributors sometimes link to something that one of them linked to a year or more ago.)

The late historian Raphael Samuel’s, 1994 work Theatres of Memory had a huge impact on me (and very much echoed the consistent methodological guidance that David Cohen offered to me). Samuel reinforced my sense that various kinds of documentary ephemera and flows of cultural production were a crucial kind of historical evidence overlooked by scholars, information that the conventional nature of most archives excluded from view. That’s one of the amazing revelations of the post-web world for historians: a lot of ephemera is suddenly exposed to view, if inconsistently and whimsically. You can spend an afternoon just compiling bits and pieces of material culture for sale on eBay that would have been all but impossible to find in museums or archives before 1990, no matter how intellectually useful such items might have been.

Passages in its early 1990s incarnation almost feels to me like a prescient look ahead at what might be possible in an online world. The sad thing to me is that it’s still a potential largely uncaptured. Group blogs are great, but I wish there were also group depositories for historians or area specialists, scholarly Boing Boings with a more thought out scheme for laying down new deposits of information in some archival structure that encourages ready recall of information. You wouldn’t expect them to be fast-paced, or even the kind of thing that people read regularly the way we read blogs. Just that when you came across a letter or document or picture or comic strip or bit of material culture or other ephemera that you recognized as having an interesting character, you’d go ahead and deposit it. Not as a systematic archive, but more along the lines of Boing Boing’s declared purpose, a “directory of wonderful things”.

I know that there would be copyright issues. For example, there’s a letter I typed verbatim into my database when I was working in the National Archives of Zimbabwe. I’ve occasionally shared it with students because it’s an extraordinarily complex and ambivalent document. I’d love to just put it somewhere online that was maintained as a repository. The letter is well over 60 years old. But doing so unilaterally would collide the rights of that archive with the desire of scholars to draw from it. I wouldn’t want to do that without thinking the consequences through very carefully. Martin Duberman has a remarkable essay called “‘Writhing Bedfellows’ in Antebellum South Carolina: Historical Interpretation and the Politics of Evidence” (available in the 1989 anthology Hidden From History) that I recommend to anyone who wants to think about the intrinsic trickiness of relationships between archives and scholars, and of the importance of working through that intricacy with great care.

In any event, the new Passages comes close to doing or being the kind of thing I’d like to see: an organized depository of found primary or evidentiary material of interest to scholars. Alongside our blogging and carnivals, I’d like to see many more such projects flourish as we grow into the online environment.

crossposted at Cliopatria

Posted in Academia, Africa, Blogging | 7 Comments

A Simple Lie, or the Can’t-Do Party

Like I’ve said, predictions and acting on predictions, that’s a complicated business. What’s not complicated is when the head of Homeland Security says, “Nobody could have predicted that this would happen”.

You can’t spin your way past that one. You can’t lie your way out of that hole. You can’t do what has apparently becoming fashionable among the flacks and toadies of the punditocracy and blogosphere that now want to claim they speak for the Republican Party, and flush anything remotely resembling principles or consistency down the toilet in order to praise Our Dear Leader and all his appointees. I do honestly beg your pardon for saying so to those of you who are regular Republican voters, because I know you’re not necessarily at all the same as the people who now represent your party on the national stage. Hell, I vote Republican on occasion, when the man or woman so nominated is a worthy one. But goddamn it, you folks who do so regularly, you’ve got to stand up now and be counted. This is your hour to call in your chips and make your party start to be something closer to what you imagine it to be. If not, if not: well, look at the company you’re keeping. If that doesn’t worry you, honestly, screw you. I worry enough about the company I have to keep on some arguments and positions, and say so. If you can’t be bothered to draw the line between your decency and the screaming indecency of your leadership, then what’s the point?

Do you believe in standards? In accountability? In competency? Make your beliefs have some bite to them. I’m all for fairness and complexity and sensitivity to the difficulty of the job we’re setting for our public servants. I’m all for a breathtaking rethink of the entire nature of government. Even with all the intricacy of the deeper issues, there’s a kind of basic ground floor of decency, competency and honesty here. Chertoff and Brown, at the very least are so far below that ground floor that they might as well be swimming in the Earth’s molten core.

Posted in Politics | 11 Comments

Update on the Precautionary Principle

Gary Farber has been doing an impressive job of compiling a wide variety of reports on the situation in New Orleans, particularly from The Interdictor, who is blogging from within New Orleans.

One thing I’ll take back about my original entry is the assertion that the only real failure here was to have ready-state relief resources dedicated to New Orleans well-funded and poised during hurricane season, that the money issue is the only issue. I know it’s easy to criticize from this distance, but avoidable incompetence, especially at FEMA, is now very obviously a part of the problem. Like a number of readers, I was particularly astonished at the claim in a Washington Post article that one of the broken levees was plugged by a private contractor who got tired of FEMA’s dithering and just went out and did it, but also by the recent report that officials in Houston just decided, after buses started arriving, that they can’t accomodate most of the refugees in the Astrodome after all. I understand their reasoning (fire safety) but why couldn’t they decide that earlier?

Gary Jones and I appear to disagree about some things, particularly at the level of particular emphasis or intensity of assessment, but I think he’s absolutely right that this crisis is exposing more than just simple incompetence, and absolutely right to find my earlier post lacking in this sense. My earlier argument that we just need more funding, better applications of the precautionary principle, or smarter forms of expertise isn’t sufficient. There’s something far deeper wrong here, certainly something deeper than a particular President’s actions (though come on, he hasn’t even done even remotely well the few small things that could be done right in this crisis by a President, hasn’t demonstrated any of the decisiveness that ought to be his forte as a leader, if you listen to his cult-of-personality devotees).

Development experts, when their latest plans or schemes fail in some fashion, either complain that they were almost there when someone yanked out the rug from underneath them or they blithely move on to the next fad or fashionable development plan and forget whatever the last one was. Just suggesting, as I did, that all this system needs is more money or more effective leadership, comes close to doing the same thing. There were lots of plans, lots of knowledge, lots of resources, even if the plans fell short, the knowledge was insufficient, and the resources too limited when the crisis came. When a local contractor can just head out and plug a gap in a levee that a gigantic lumbering bureaucracy paralytically just contemplates, it becomes clear that what is missing is a kind of common sense, that the whole system is immensely fragile for all that it is huge and powerful. The reforms we need most are structural reforms, not just funding or a better executive director for FEMA or a different President. Gary’s right: the whole system of managing our lived relationship to environments and coping with catastrophes or problems needs a vastly more robust, distributed character, the same kind of shift that Bruce Schneier has urged in our approach to security issues.

Later addendum: Michael Brown, director of FEMA, may or may not be incompetent in technical terms. But blaming people for not evacuating, and that’s exactly what he’s doing in this interview, is just a shitty, mean little thing to do. It’s a kind of whining, an anti-leadership. What, he thinks it is not appropriate to talk now about why megamillions in contingency planning failed so grotesquely but it is appropriate right now to scapegoat people who mostly lacked the means to evacuate and were provisioned with no meaningful assistance in evacuating? Yes, some people just decided to stay, for a variety of reasons. However, look at the people we’ve been seeing on television: it’s plain that many of them could not get out unless someone expressly helped them get out. There was no consistent provision of such assistance.

There’s the one conversation that some of us are having about what could or could not have been done systematically, about how disaster planning works or doesn’t work. There’s another thing altogether, and that’s about the ability of political and bureaucratic leaders as well as pundits and ordinary folk to show a kind of common-sense decency in grappling with the situation, in understanding its meaning to us as human beings. That’s not so important when it comes to concretely solving or fixing problems, but it is important in terms of defining the character of the American people. There are many leaders and observers and ordinary folk who are making me proud to be American. Michael Brown makes me feel the opposite. Jonah Goldberg, cracking cheap jokes about Waterworld and then making a non-apology apology that’s almost worse, makes me feel the opposite. Whomever the deranged assholes are who are shooting at helicopters and threatening to loot hospitals make me feel the opposite. There are two tests here: can we do better as a society in understanding and solving major problems, and can we be decent, can we demonstrate character.

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Small Suggestion

This idea has cropped up in a couple of variant forms in various places–Glenn Reynolds notes that the University of Tennessee has already taken 50 law students from Tulane and Loyola— but it’ll take quick action to systematically reproduce that kind of assistance . Academics are asking what Tulane, Xavier and Loyola intend to do next–the Tulane website has been compelling reading since Katrina hit. (Xavier and Loyola’s websites appear to have been taken out by the crisis, from what I can see tonight.)

Why not get a huge network of colleges and universities together, proportionately distribute the student bodies of all these institutions across the network, offer automatic transfer admissions to your size-adjusted and randomly designated proportion of that student population, with the New Orleans institutions agreeing to honor all credits taken at the host institution as if they were taken at Tulane, Xavier or Loyola. Treat the tuition paid to the New Orleans schools as if it were paid to your institution but allow Tulane, Xavier and Loyola to keep the tuition so they can make their bills for the academic year. (E.g., the host institutions would accept the transfer students as a freebie). Pay transport costs for the affected students and waive the cost of their room and board for the year as well. If there’s any desire to do it, just do it quickly and without quibbles and carping, as a way to help those institutions keep themselves intact and financially sound as institutions, considering that it’s likely to be at least a year before they can operate on any basis roughly comparable to what they were doing before Katrina hit. For senior undergraduates who were beginning culminating projects or research, or graduate students, try to work out some kind of ongoing distance connection to their faculty supervisors, and maybe even have the host pay to bring the faculty supervisors to visit their advisees for a week in the spring.

Posted in Academia | 11 Comments

Precautionary Principles

It is hard to know how, when, whether and how much to plan for future events.

I teach a course on the history of concepts of the future and the specific post-1945 growth (and decline) of a form of expertise that claimed superior insight into the course of future events.

Many of the experts who peddled their wares at the high-water mark of futurology were about as accurate as the fortune-telling machine at an old carnival, or random guessing. Some were less so. In a few cases, I suppose you could credit predictions with mobilizing policy responses which actually prevented the problem that was predicted from coming to pass. But on some of the most crucial predictions, say population growth, what most of the experts advised has had nothing to do with preventing the future they predicted.

On the other hand, there are other cases where models offered by experts have been powerfully predictive and where those models could have served as useful guides for making concrete preparations for likely future events and circumstances. Many of what I’ve called the prudential critics of the war in Iraq (which is how I would describe myself) accurately forecast many of the fundamental contradictions and specific policy problems facing the post-invasion occupation forces. Their forecasts and analyses were discounted by the White House and mocked or scorned by pro-war pundits and opinion-makers. Now most of those advocates of the war are moving the goalposts, obscuring the debate, or looking for scapegoats.

Hurricane Katrina is an even better example. Here’s a specific scenario which has been well understood and thoroughly modeled for decades. It’s not just the generality of New Orleans’ vulnerability to a major hurricane that’s at issue: at least one of the levee breaches, on the Industrial Canal, was specifically described by those who studied the system as being vulnerable.

What we’re seeing now, however, makes it clear that very few serious contingency plans were in place, and that those that are in place are failing in part because those charged with executing them do not have sufficient resources (people and equipment) to cope with the situation, or in a few cases, because they’re unreliable institutionally (for example, eyewitness reports that New Orleans police are in a few cases actually joining in the looting).

Before Katrina, New Orleans had one of the worst cases of structural poverty of any major American city, as well as deep historical problems with the reliability of city services and the trustworthiness of its police force. If any serious contingency planning for this event was going to be done, the money for it would have had to come from the state and/or the federal government. Because this is the issue: you can have accurate models, good forecasts, and even some very good paper planning on dealing with foreseeable problems. I’m sure we’re going to find that the plans on paper for a post-hurricane response in New Orleans looked pretty decent. What we’re also seeing, however, is that few of the actual material resources needed for executing those plans were readily available for use, that few of the engineering scenarios for plugging the city’s levees had actually been taken beyond the drawing board, that many of the possible technical improvements that could have been made in preparation were not made. (I saw somewhere that the Army Corps of Engineers has offered a terse reply on a FAQ about “dewatering New Orleans” regarding why the levees weren’t prepared for more than a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane: such a preparation was “unauthorized”.) The Superdome scenario has been on the books for a while, I’m sure, but it’s also clear that not much thought was given to what was going to be happening there on Day 4 or so when the water and food started to become difficult to obtain, the city was still flooded with dangerously contaminated water, and crowd-control started to become a serious issue.

Ok. It would be easy to write all this off as incompetence, but it’s not. The real problem is and will remain money. Having all the resources ready to go to deal with this long-foreseen crisis at a moment’s notice would have taken both one-time and continuing expenditures. The political will to make those expenditures has never existed. Perhaps that’s because planners sat down quietly behind closed doors and decided that the specific community of New Orleans was expendable, unworthy of that kind of precautionary investment, that if it came to that, everyone would pretend to be terribly concerned and do what they could, but that’s about all. Perhaps it’s because the US government and state governments in general lack the political will to meaningfully spend money making meaningful plans, that the money which might go to maintaining ready-state contingency plans goes instead to pork, to paying for studies of possible terrorist attacks on small Midwestern towns of 2,000 people and the like.

The precautionary principle is much abused in a world full of entrepreneurial experts who are continuously roving the halls of government and civic institutions seeking to suck down funding to support their own favored scenarios. Sorting through the din and clamor of rent-seeking competition would take a kind of technopolitical wisdom that we systematically lack: we do not have the means, the institutions, the distributed knowledge, to do that. One of the consequences of our shortcomings in this respect is that we not only waste money on empty scenarios and bogus futurology, but we fail to spend money in concentrated fashion on concrete preparations for those scenarios whose future occurance is not just hypothetical but practically inevitable. Does anybody today feel even the least bit of confidence in the US government’s likely ability to respond to a major incident of nuclear or biological terrorism in a U.S. city? In the likely ability of the federal government or state and municipal governments to handle 8.0 and up earthquakes in the Los Angeles basin, San Francisco Bay or Seattle areas? In the ability of New York City to handle a near-direct hit from a hurricane the magnitude of Katrina (less probable or certain than New Orleans, but still quite possible, and NYC has many of the same vulnerabilities as the Big Easy had)? Especially in the case of terrorism, I think most of us agree that feeling confidence about the probable response of our government is an important component of successfully coping with terrorism in the first place.

It’s wrong to spend money carelessly under the sign of the precautionary principle, to be ruled by its most expansive tenets, to ignore the cost-to-benefit ratio of such expenditure. But it is equally wrong to whistle past the biggest graveyards, to make paper plans that are funded fitfully, inconsistently or not at all.

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