Liveblogging State of Play, Day 2, Session 1

I’m at the developer roundtable.
Dan Norton, Raph Koster, Jesse Houston, Nick Fortugno, Mike Sellers

[Me: Thank god for these guys, just as an aside: developers interested in exploratory conversations about the form, who don’t just stare at people and say, “It’s all under NDA, everything is under NDA, my breakfast cereal is under NDA”.]

Raph Koster: there’s much less diversity in MMOs, no experimentation.

Mike Sellers: it’s easier to talk about the few places where something is changing. Mike says even Eve Online is “kill monsters, get gold” [ME: I don’t really think so]. In some respects, tools are less sophisticated now than they were in the 1990s. So question is, where are the little mammals that will survive if the dinosaur designs die? Says, “Maybe the little games in Facebook”.

Nick Fortugno: We conflate too many things together, an MMO doesn’t have to be a fantasy RPG. Why does everything get defined by World of Warcraft? Massively multiple participation before these technologies was about voting, other kinds of big social experiences; we don’t have a deep imagination of what a game with 10,000 people might be.

Jesse Houston: Let’s stop talking about WoW as the winner. It isn’t a winner, it’s a benchmark.

Raph Koster: WoW just has as many players as a bad little cable show that’s heading for cancellation. [ME: 1. Guys, stop talking about WoW: it always makes developers look like sour grapes purveyors. 2. NO individual game scales well against other popular culture.]

Mike Sellers: there are more bird-watchers or NASCAR fans than MMO players.

Dan Norton: let’s be positive!

Mike Sellers: I want to stay negative for a moment. Virtual worlds aren’t real the way lots of things are real. Maybe we’re just talking about buggy whips or player-pianos. [ME: but Mike, when player pianos had a big market, player piano makers talked about them. Should they have stopped talking about them then because someday there was going to be an iPod Touch? By that context, stop talking about airplanes, televisions, etc.]

Mike Sellers: publics are media and entertainment agnostic, meaning they’ll move on. Who cares about Joanie Loves Chachi these days, for example? [ME: Mike! Take a look!]

Nick: Learning curve difficulties, ossification of the form as obstacle to new players. If these are skewed always to people with huge amounts of time, they’ll never evolve.

Raph: average in all virtual worlds, even pre-graphics, is 20 hours/week. So economies, graphics, etc., doesn’t make a difference in terms of engaging players. The nature of the engagement hasn’t changed.

Quick exchanges between whole panel: upshot, we’re not as mass market as we could be, some things are. [ME: GUYS WHY IS BEING THE MOST MASSIFIED THING POSSIBLE THE GOAL? Seriously, not even television or movie producers imagine that the film they are making must have total penetration of the mass market to succeed.]

Jesse: We need tools for players to take more control over experience of play.

Raph: I’ve tried.

Nick: We have to approach games keeping in mind what they are for people, what they expect.

Raph: Dancing is my poster child in MMO design. There was dancing in text muds, then it went away in graphic MMOs, then I got a lot of people asking for dancing in SWG, so I put it in. But a lot of people complained, why are you spending time on dancing as a design? But now we have dancing in every MMO. [ME: Did AC, EQ, UO really not have a /dance emote? I can’t remember.] So we need things that have common cultural touchstones in MMOs.

Nick: A lot of emergent behaviors in earlier MMOs have become codified, and then become expectations for hard-coded design structures in all subsequent MMOs. Strong tied people: my real friends VS. my acquaintances/loose ties.

Mike: MMOs today are good at supporting strong tied connections, actually, not weak ties though.

Raph: agree with Mike. They cluster people a lot, they make strong ties, and that’s as much a design consequence as a social prior. We should figure out how to support ‘weak ties’ better–that’s what something like ‘Mafia Wars’ does.

Nick: But I think there’s been lots of experimentation with weak ties in MMOs and not so much trying to imagine in new ways dealing with strong ties. But weak ties are what’s new and interesting in our world, and these technologies, so it’s where all our attention should be.

Mike: intentional communities as an interesting way to think about weak ties. But it’s very risky to experiment with novel forms for intentional communities.

Nick: when casual games started, we were very surprised by the people who played them, we thought it would be the same people who were already gamers. So suddenly there are conventions for casual games: don’t ever use the keyboard, don’t use the right mouse button, etc. So the way forward is to look at the interactive conventions that exist for an audience. You want what’s natural, e.g. Wii Sports. [ME: But what’s ‘natural’ in physical, real-world games like golf and tennis has layers of complexity, too: there’s the casual golf and the serious golf in the real world too]

Mike: All other software besides games has an external task it has to satisfy, some external need; a game has to create the task that will be fun.

Raph: there is a collision between making the game challenging vs. increasing sociability. Can you make a better chat system? Yes. But does it make the game worse? Yes. Instancing makes the game run better, but it ruins the social system. Travel is treated as a nuisance in virtual worlds, but it forces people to have social connections to people near them, not always be where their friends are. In-world economies need more travel, but we don’t think about that.

Dan: Are there things that players expect in MMOs that you wish had never happened? Features you’d love to eradicate forever?

Jesse: I wish guilds had less rigid structures, and there were more innovative structures supported.

Mike: We did have other structures in Meridan 59. But then you have to support those variations, and that’s a design burden. So we moved towards a norm, which takes relatively minimal and modular design.

Raph: I would kill levels and classes. They’re rigid and limiting. [ME: But then why does Metaplace, a fairly social world, have levels????]

Mike: Asheron’s Call’s allegiances were a non-guild system that was kind of an alternative to level-class.

Jesse: City of Heroes has a weak-tie mechanic.

Mike: So what I would kill is questing. It robs us the ability to experience deeper, better narratives. Appeal for dynamic world.

Jesse: right, we should have dynamic worlds where lots of things can happen.

Nick: Let’s get rid of MMOs that present to each player the promise of being the hero.

Raph: the problem is just the weight of the conventions we’re importing from game to game, to the detriment of the form, some of which come from before digital media.

Jesse: that’s a problem with more than MMOs, all digital games have this issue.

[ME: I’m going to need to think about this panel and write something later. I think these guys are largely stuck chasing their own tails in some curious and unnecessary ways.]

Dan: So what should we be building?

Raph: Let’s make persistence more central, the dynamism of worlds more important.

Mike: yes, but persistence can take a lot of forms, can be just about identities and not about worlds.

Jesse: I think achievements are a really nice feature, can be even more of it, giving people more and more ways to be distinctive and individualized.

Dan: But achievements are almost a better, richer way to data-mine player experiences.

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State of Play, Day 2

Trying to think about yesterday’s sessions before we get started. What is sticking with me is this:

1. No application, design or game can live up to the utopian imagination of potential users or players, and that utopian imagination is surprisingly resilient in the face of many disappointments. I’ve been writing a bit recently about a couple of notorious past cases of vaporware MMOs where players really expected everything and more from them: a sandbox, a mimetic mirror of the world, an instrument to reform real life, and more fun than a barrel full of monkeys. So I should know better to have those feelings myself by now. And yet, I really was struggling with deflated feelings as I messed around with Metaplace during and after Raph Koster’s keynote on it. Those feelings aren’t fair to Metaplace, which seems very interesting in many respects, and provides some fascinating points of contrast and comparison to Second Life in particular. But somehow I was expecting an authoring environment that would generate a wider variety of visual and narrative experiences for users and a wider range of implied invitations to possible creators. Maybe that has yet to come, because it’s still very early days for it. The thing for me now is to see it for what it is and what it was meant by its producers to be. Still, even in those terms, to go back to my post from yesterday, I was struck that Raph seemed to position Metaplace in terms of functions and purposes that are already strongly served or satisfied by existing tools and applications.

2. This morning, Doug Thomas is talking about the theme of “Plateau” for the conference, and in the magic circle and economies panel, I did feel that we’re at a point rather like that. But it makes it frustrating because it’s hard to move the conversation onward in a number of respects.

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Liveblogging From State of Play, Session 4

On Virtual Economies

Julian Dibbell’s introduction: maybe virtual economies were not so important, or not as important as we thought in the way that we thought they were. Maybe RMT doesn’t have to be quite the battleground that it was. Virtual economies don’t have to be radically autonomous to be richly interesting and playful.

Stephanie Rothenberg

Sweatshop education through reenactment in Second Life, film “Invisible Threads”

[Comment: the problem here is that the reality of MMO games trumps the polemical intent of their project, I think. Not the RMT sweatshops, but just think of pizza-making in The Sims Online, and how quick some players were to turn their leisure into a sweatshop-style operation. But I readily confess to a strong bias against serious games that are crafted as polemics–I think they’re an inefficient way to make a critique and end up reinforcing the image of left critique as cheerless (e.g., taking play and making play ‘serious’). Plus it’s hard not to end up as condescending towards the people you’re meaning to polemicize–they haven’t gotten our message yet, so we have to use a game! Not usually thoughtful as Bogost is about what makes a game persuasive, often just a translation of a polemical text into a mechanically simple game structure.]

Margaret Wallace, Rebel Monkey Properties

CampFu, casual teen-oriented game. Designer trying to talk about how they think about putting an economy into the gameplay.

[My thought: I’m really struck here at how unvarnished or undisguised the instrumentalism of design thinking about an economy here is: that it is designed to make players do something which is not the economy itself (“engagement”) is the word here, but not fun in and of itself. But what’s not clear to me, and Juho Hamari’s interesting work earlier in the meeting really seems to be saying interesting things on this subject, is whether they’re actually right about whether economic design is instrumentally effective.]

Andy Schneider, Live Gamer. New startup. Talking about RMT. Live Gamer proposed to integrate with an MMO rather that be outside of it, sort of a new covenant with developers. Average transaction size $45-50, greatest volume is Fridays. Live Gamer also works with GoPets’ secondary market: [ME: parents, lock up your credit cards.] [Schneider doesn’t really talk about the other big side of this, I think: the more the developer directly benefits from the cash value of items, the more you are tempted to design straight to that premise, so that cash differentially buys what in-game labor time now buys.

Ted Castronova

Fusion of real and virtual work spaces and labor value was inevitable; markets will seek more efficient solutions, less trouble, lower transaction costs.

We need to think about the policy and social consequences of the current state of economies in virtual worlds, however, to not merely let markets dictate this. Also argues it is in the self-interest of the game industry to be worried about the merging of the real and virtual; among other things, taxation will be extracted directly per transaction once the state is finally aware that this merger has happened. If it’s kept fuzzy, maybe the state’s presence or role can be kept fuzzy.

Need to actually make active decisions now, policies, not leave it to developers, create serious covenants between players.

————-

Curious exchange later: James Bower of Whyville.net described himself as training children for civic and political life through Whyville, and compared it to a Greek city-state. Knowing something about Greek city-states, I’m thinking this is a less wholesome comparison than he thinks. But Ted Castronova really pushed back on him, and noted that it’s an odd thing for someone in an autocratic position to be seeing themselves as preparing kids for democratic citizenship. Bower said, “Yeah, it’s a Greek city-state, and I’m Zeus”. Well, it’s an old metaphor with virtual worlds, actually, so not that odd.

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Liveblogging From State of Play, NYC, Session 3

“Breaking the Magic Circle”

We had a prior discussion at my table about whether there’s anything much left of use in “the magic circle” as a concept, and someone mentioned a recent discussion by Jesper Juul on the issue.

Jerry Paffendorf discusses the graphing of different kinds of online experiences at Metaverseroadmap.org, point of observing that the ways in which virtual world experiences spill out or become visible to some publics. He’s got a project for selling a square inch of land in Detroit, using them to link to virtual spaces. (Loveland)

——————-

Alexander Macris, publisher & editorial director of The Escapist.

Use of achievement system within forums spurred a lot of forum participants to find ways to get badges, etc, how that makes participation (and incentives) on a forum very “game-like”, MMO type…so how MMOs are becoming a larger metapractice. How to make rock-paper-scissors more exciting–culmulative, competitive, contextual. “for our audience, what mattered more was what was outside the ‘game’ of badges, not inside of it–the external systems of recording etc.”

———————

Beth Coleman, media studies at MIT

“emergent design principles in X-reality design”
how design between virtual and real interact and iterate on each other
“if we’re moving toward ubiquitious computing, we need to move towards an experience of ubiquitious use”

Another claim in this case that 3d modeling makes controlling or commanding processes in the real world, but I find this one much more satisfying and intriguing, partly because it’s not a comprehensive claim, focused on particular (and highly spatial) kinds of physical work that requires complex two-way information flows.

More detailed paper on her arguments is availabl
e. Very interesting.
———————–

Elizabeth Lawley
“tangible matters”
the tangibility of the virtual makes a difference.

Why are we at this conference, given that we could do it all online?
social capital needs to transfer across a magic circle to be valuable; can’t be tied up in a world

Liz argues that this is about inherent desire, that we have a need for materiality.

[One thought: I wonder how much of this point is getting tangled up in a difference between the ephemeral and the persistent, e.g., we value some objects not just because they’re material, graspable, touchable, but because they last. there are a lot of ‘tangible’ things which are very short-lived that we struggle to keep hold of, and a lot of tangible but ephemeral moments are also private, only something you remember: a view on a hike, a butterfly that crosses our path, etc.]

———————

Dennis Crowley, how game-logics spill out into the world. A lot like Thomas Malaby’s point about gas mileage and ludocapitalism. Mentions Feltron Reports, very interesting example. Once you start thinking of everyday life in ludic terms, and social software lets you make that something other than a private or idiosyncratic understanding, what happens to everyday life.

———————–
[Another thought: as is often the case around these topics, I think people are overstating the novelty of making everyday tasks into something ludic, or creating a game-like feeling around accumulative or numerical tasks. Putting notches in a gun, etc. Heck, Gimli and Legolas playing “kill the orc”. This is a pretty old and elemental way to talk about repetition, accumulation, and so on. The difference here is the technologically-mediated collection of individual action and its reporting in systems of achievements, badges, placements into maps and spaces, and so on. The impact is not that something becomes playful suddenly that was not, but that you gain a sense of all other people playing a game; that the playfulness of tasks become transparent to all the people interested in or involved in the system. That cuts both ways, as you can see with WoW achievements. On one hand, it’s fascinating to find out what everyone else is doing in WoW, and what your practice is in relation to that; on the other hand, it becomes a driver of what people do, and the basis for a new and maybe unwanted system of social power.]

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Liveblogging From State of Play, NYC, Session 2

Government and governance in virtual worlds panel.

Tori Horton, description of how virtual worlds can link to public diplomacy, reviews weaknesses and strengths of virtual worlds for servicing public diplomacy.

My comment: same issue as with Raph’s framing of Metaplace, really. Why should we privilege or turn to virtual worlds for communicative purposes? What can we do more there that we can’t with other media forms or tools? (I think we can, but I feel like folks who are advocates of virtual worlds get pretty cagey about this point.) Either it’s about particular publics that are important or it’s about a way of communicating that has distinctive character, effects, etc. (which might include being indirect or diffuse in communicating)

Jean Miller, governance. When government agencies were interested in being in Second Life, why? What kinds of challenges did they face?

Me: in a way, this is kind of the story that’s now being told about Second Life as a quasi-postmortem: all the organizations and institutions that went into Second Life with an idea about what virtuality was and would do for them, and found difficulties, etc.–most of them are now absent from Second Life or very nearly so. I think this is where virtual worlds as an overall idea or media form are at this point now as a whole: they were oversold as the arrival of the Metaverse, the virtual world as replacement or overlay for the world. Instead, it’s just a media form, an interesting one, but it can’t do any of the things that were expected of it (or that were hyped about it).

Elizabeth Losh. Virtual state. Book, Virtualpolitik. Thinking about military video games, why and how do militaries choose to make games. Interested in how game developers come into the military institution, but points out that when people come to doing a game from the military side is in some ways more interesting. Looking at the way that Iraq specifically was represented in military games. Emergent play within several worlds, used to train but also for other purposes (therapy for PTSD, for example). Use of game to demonstrate or authenticate an existing project from government. Looking at repurposing of Second Life Iraq representations for artistic or political commentary.

William May, description of official thinking about use of virtual worlds within State Department, esp. Second Life, how they took an interest, what they thought they could do within Second Life that they couldn’t do otherwise. “It’s just another medium: it has to let us do something that we couldn’t do otherwise”.

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Liveblogging From State of Play, NYC

Raph Koster, “A New Kind of World”, keynote

Focused on Metaplace.

Had to ban his own brother from UO. Brother is now cyberactivist. But virtual worlds don’t have that relevance, really. Nothing has happened in them that matters by comparison to what’s happening with Twitter, blogs, and so on. Virtual worlds aren’t really social media, despite our looking at them with such excitement.

Why do we assume virtual worlds are relevant, given how the incredibly relevant character of other new media, online tools, etc.? The thing is that other online media forms are largely open, individually autonomous, decentralized.

“Virtual worlds don’t really work this way”. Metaplace, he argues, is different. It’s open, designed to work with and be like the Web.

But what is the “killer app” for virtual worlds? It’s wasting time, having fun, escapism. Serious uses aren’t what they’re about.

HERE is my big question at this point, then. 1. Why should a place for “having fun” be interoperable with the Web, being open, and so on? Without going too far towards the “magic circle”, a lot of play and leisure are set aside or semi-separated from the rest of everyday life. The Web is a place for acting, publishing, intercommunicating; those things can happen in play, but trying to make play into a place for acting, publishing, intercommunicating is missing in a way what people want from entertainment and play? 2. Why do we want to do these things through avatars, 3d representations, etc.? There is an old desire to make interfaces visual, but maybe the centrality of text to the Web isn’t an accident. Once you describe Metaplace the way Raph does, the question is, ‘Why not just stick with Twitter, blogs, Flickr…what is missing from the Web that Metaplace provides? Or for that matter, what is missing from digital games? Warcraft provides a game, the Sims a dollhouse.

The beginning of Raph’s answer: it involves placeness, persistence and avatars.

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This Cupcake Will Not Stand

Don’t you kind of wonder how this woman thought she’d come out looking from this New York Times article?

On one hand, she seems perfectly aware that most of the other parents at the schools her kids have been at don’t like her much, nor do the school administrators. On the other hand, she seems so serenely unperturbed by the existence of other people with other views than her own, or by a little thing we academics like to call “culture”, who knows? She might feel that a wider window into her actions would result in a round of applause from the wider society for her righteous crusade.

———

I’m in New York for a conference this week. On the train up, I happened to be next to a very talkative older woman. To whom I was perfectly polite, before you go on accusing me of anything. I was struck, though, at the way she described history, both personal and shared. Some of what she had to say was a garden-variety account of how the world is going to hell in a handbasket, a story we’re all prone to tell with increasingly frequency as we age. But her version had a particular flavor to it, in which all of her choices as a young person were exactly what they should have been, and all of the choices of everyone younger than thirty now were exactly the opposite. Some declension stories are about the world, and our helplessness before it, but hers was, “I did everything right, and now everyone’s doing everything wrong.” She worked hard, now the young folk are all lazy. She liked the right kinds of books and right kinds of movies and now the kids are all perverts. She fell in love with the right man, now young women fall in love with sex fiends and wastrels. Maybe she did live the right life, though in my mind, living the right life includes not caring altogether that much about how other people live theirs.

The interesting (if consistent) amendment to her view of the world was that there is one and only one group of people under 30 who have in fact done the right thing: her own adult children. They’ve chosen the right careers, live in the right places, married the right people, raised their own young children the right way. Which in her view I think is just a vindication of the rightness of her own choices.

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The reason I recount this somewhat painful trip alongside the mother crusading against birthday cupcakes in the schools is this: if there is a single thing I’m prepared to get righteously aggravated by at this point in my life, it’s people whose vision of their own lives rises perpetually towards their own righteous vindication.

I’m all about the doubts these days, I wallow in uncertainty. Sure, I’m still right about all sorts of shit, and don’t you forget it.

I guess.

But if you want to be an aggravating irritant to the lives of every other adult trying to raise or teach a kid in your community, you’d better be damn sure the cause justifies it. If you’re Atticus Finch, green light, go for it. If you’re the scourge of the snacks, and brook no dissent? You might want to worry more about the epidemic spread of “lack of proportionality and self-awareness” before you worry about the epidemic of obesity. If you’re my seat-mate, would it hurt for you to imagine a story of your life where experience leads to humility, even a little teeny bit?

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History As It Was

I’m finally getting around to last week’s NY Times piece by Patricia Cohen about the decline of the “traditional” specializations in history departments. Rather like the last Cohen piece that drew my attention, it feels a bit detached from time and space, describing a decade-long discussion as a suddenly urgent controversy.

This particular topic is one that I knocked around a few times while I was actively posting at Cliopatria. In one sense, it’s a discussion about history that needs a more fully realized sense of history. At least two moments in particular in the discipline’s 20th Century development need a closer examination for a better understanding of what the shift away from “traditional” diplomatic and political history means: first, how and when the methodological, rhetorical and canonical norms of diplomatic, military and political history of that sort developed, and second, about the initial rise of social history and then cultural history in tension with “traditional” political and diplomatic history.

I don’t have a good feel for the detailed answers to the first question, except that I’m sure that the highly professionalized, rigorously disciplinary kinds of political, diplomatic and military history that most specialists would cite as the canon in those fields are not the same thing as the kinds of histories written from the end of the 19th Century into the first third of the 20th. Yet it seems to me that defenders of these ‘traditions’ tend (as do most defenders of ‘traditions’) to be incurious about the development of the norms and practices of those fields. In part, that’s because once you have an awareness that your preferred approaches are not timeless, but displaced some other form or approach to writing history, that puts the rise of subsequent approaches in a slightly different perspective. If you can blur your own intellectual history, you can plant your feet in Herodotus and Ranke and make any newcomers out to be carpetbaggers.

The second institutional moment may be an uncomfortable one to recall because at least some political, diplomatic and military historians were markedly uncharitable towards their new social historian colleagues when social history began its intellectual and institutional rise. As, in some cases, social historians were towards the new breed of cultural historians, and doubtless as cultural historians will be or are being towards the next wave of interests or approaches. That’s not about the peculiar or unusual intolerance of a particular mode of doing history, that’s about the sociology and organization of academia. Junior scholars with an interest in political, diplomatic or military history may legitimately be puzzled about being held responsible for the practices of scholars one generation removed from their own senior colleagues today, but as historians, we shouldn’t find it much of a stretch to recognize that the people in power today in the discipline were shaped (or scarred) by their own traverse through relative powerlessness. It’s not a good thing that some of us do to the next generation what our own elders did to us, but it’s not a surprising thing that this should happen. Keeping this in mind, at any rate, puts the complaint in a slightly broader perspective, and dials down some of the cries of victimization.

————–

That’s one thought. Here’s another: I wonder to what extent some of what is regarded as “traditional” historical writing as described in the Cohen article is alive and well but has migrated into other disciplines or melded into approaches which are labeled in other ways. “Traditional” intellectual history, for example, strikes me as very powerfully integrated into a good deal of what is labeled as cultural history. What has changed in some cases is simply the scope or range of how historians trace the development of an idea, concept or philosophy so that they are talking not just about the development of an idea across a series of texts, but with wider circulations of that idea in other forms of expressive culture and in everyday practice in mind. Similarly, a book like William Cooper’s Town seems to me to be a remarkably effective integration of “political history” with “social history”. Jan de Vries is an economic historian, but his work is also powerfully informed by a massive body of social history. When he makes his key claim that economic modernity was not so much a reorganization of production as a reorganization of productivity, that’s as much a social historian’s argument as an economic one.

Likewise, some “traditional” approaches to intellectual history have moved into disciplines like literary criticism, while some political and diplomatic history of the established sort can be found in political science departments (those that haven’t yet become dominated by quantitative social science, at any rate).

It seems odd to me that the defenders of a “traditional” approach to these fields don’t recognize the vibrancy of the way that they’ve intermingled with other approaches or specializations as a good outcome, or seem to lose all interest in “traditional” work once it migrates out of a history department into some other part of the university. But this is part and parcel of the way that culture-war rhetoric works when it turns its gaze on the academy: the prevalence of fashionable nonsense is frequently overstated, and labels and titles are used as totalizing descriptions of content. Hayden White and J.G.A. Pocock both have written intellectual histories, but if you threw their work together into the same bin because of that label, you’d be missing the point entirely.

———

That equivalence of the labelling of scholarly work with the content of that work points to another issue, which is whether we want to have any account of the development of disciplinary history as a form of progress. It seems to me that some defenders of “traditional” forms don’t view much or any of the vast body of published work in other specializations as adding to what we know about the past. But speaking in the most ‘traditional’, positivistic sense, I can’t see how it’s possible to adopt that posture. You may think that histories of gender are now overrepresented in the field. That’s a legitimately arguable premise. But that’s coming from a near-zero percentage of historical scholarship only forty years ago or so. Over the past forty years, social and cultural historians of all stripes, from the rigorously quantitative or materialist practicioners to the more narrative or descriptive scholars, have created a huge amount of knowledge about people, places, events, phenomena, causes and consequences about which we knew little to nothing previously. How can that in any sense be a bad thing, or not be seen as progress? Would it be better to know less?

Or must political, diplomatic, and military history be written indefinitely in a fixed, frozen form, with a fixed proportional allotment of the disciplinary pie? Part of what bugs me a bit from many of those who complain of the relative decline of these approaches is that they not only overlook their integration into other styles and specializations, but more or less give up on making a positive argument about why history written just so has a distinctive value which must be preserved. You can’t make that argument by pointing to the very best, most artful works written in a “traditional” mode and taking those as the typical example of the practices we might lose. We can play that game all day: I see your John Keegan and raise you a Lynn Hunt. The best work in any discipline is sui generis to some extent: it supercedes the specializations from which it arises. What we’re really talking about here are the everyday norms of specialized approaches that govern the production of the bulk of scholarship in a given field.

Those are the grounds on which someone has to say, “Look, diplomatic/military/political history written just so, with these norms, needs a protected place within the discipline because here’s what it does with enduring value that no other approach can do as well“.

That argument can include all sorts of things. One could argue that these fields are more readily suited to narrative history, and that narrative history is intrinsically easier for a wider public to understand or relate to. (The bookstores seem to agree: political biography, military history, narrative political and diplomatic history pretty well outsells social history by a wide margin.) You could make a more theoretical argument that formal political outcomes are explicable by formal politics, and that those outcomes are determinative of social or economic outcomes (likewise for military or diplomatic history), that social or cultural historians are simply empirically wrong to dissipate the discipline’s understanding of the political or of institutions into wider social structures or cultural formations. Or you could argue that formal politics or military history is the best place to study contingency or agency, e.g., to try to deliver something of use to your colleagues in other specializations while arguing that your own approach is the best way to approach that understanding.

There are a lot of potentially persuasive ways to go at this objective. But every specialization in a given discipline (and every discipline in the wider academy) should have to be continuously renewing these kinds of arguments about the legitimacy and necessity of their own practices. “I’m studying something we don’t yet know, using methods that are necessary to that study.” “I’m disseminating scholarship in a form or style that I believe communicates important ideas more clearly to wider audiences.” “I’m working with problems or ideas that have the deepest or best expression in a particular subfield or approach.” It’s not enough to say, “There is less diplomatic history now, and that’s not fair”. You have to do the harder thing and say, “Here’s why we need diplomatic/political/military history written in this way, in that form”. Sure, lots of other specializations have gotten lazy at doing that work themselves: it’s not enough to argue for histories of gender, for example, simply by saying that we don’t yet understand enough about the history of gender. Here’s to making everyone renew and explore their raison d’etres, and for a genuine spirit of openness about that enterprise, as opposed to just trying to reslice the disciplinary pie so that everyone gets their quota of protected legacy positions in some kind of fixed proportion.

Posted in Academia | 2 Comments

The Usefulness of Scholarship

If you define erudition as encyclopedic knowledge about a body of discrete facts, then welcome to the age of distributed erudition. It’s still a very good thing to have those facts in your head rather than to pop up on the screen at the end of a search query, but that’s like saying it’s a good thing to have a poem memorized rather than to have to read it over and over again on the page. A good thing, but not necessary.

So a scholar had better be more than erudite in that sense if there is any usefully distinctive future for scholarship. Look at the series of open questions I posted about modern African history, all of them scholarly questions with (I hope) important implications not just for understanding Africa but for understanding many other issues of continuing importance: state failure, nationalism, imperial rule, global capitalism and so on. None of them are questions that can be resolved just by searching Wikipedia alone.

Some of them are issues which a smart searcher could fairly quickly triangulate upon using online databases and catalogs. Look for “the Scramble for Africa” and not only will you find a pretty decent Wikipedia entry, but you’ll also find in library catalogs a few books that are very clearly directly concerned with that event. Look at those and you’ll pretty quickly understand not only what happened in narrative terms, but you’ll become acquainted with a long-standing debate about the causes of the Scramble that goes right back to the event itself. You’ll still need to read some of the more detailed material, but arguably you could do without an expert scholar to explain it to you. (In the end, asking the expert might be more efficient, though.)

But take the question, “how did Africans think about or understand colonialism? How important was it to them? What social and political developments in African societies were primarily a response to or critique of colonial authority?” It’s a question that runs across the whole of modern Africanist historiography, but good luck just searching for compressed, focused treatments of it using either web-wide or authoritative catalogs.

Some of the clearest scholarly conversations about the question aren’t even directly about Africa (Marshall Sahlins and Gananath Obeyesekere debating about Captain Cook and Hawaii, for one). There are almost no texts that deal exclusively with this issue as such (Jennifer Cole’s excellent Forget Colonialism? is one of the few, and even that deals with the memory of colonialism in the present rather than the past consciousness of colonial subjects). However, a concern with these questions is strongly distributed throughout the historiography.

The issue is obviously a crucial one. What do most Iraqis really feel about the U.S. occupation? Important to know, hard to know. Were any of the attacks on occupying troops motivated primarily by anger at the fact of occupation? Or were they reactions to specific mistakes or errors in the administration of occupation in its first two years? Or did they have little to do with occupation per se and more to do with pre-existing conflicts between factions in Iraq? Those were important questions at the height of the occupation and they’re still important. There is no simple way to answer them. Even with access to extensive polling data and a wealth of information about what ordinary people are supposedly thinking in the U.S. or Western Europe, these kinds of questions are extremely difficult to answer satisfactorily.

My understanding of African history of a scholar gives me tools for helping others to answer those questions.

The first step is settling on a model for how people think, and how (or whether) what they think informs how they act. There are a number of arguments out there which claim that if consciousness doesn’t inform concrete, visible action in the world, it doesn’t really matter as far as the historian or anthropologist is concerned. From that perspective, in fact, consciousness doesn’t matter at all: just study visible action.

But on the other hand, there are plenty of arguments that what people say about why they did something and the actual reasons they did it don’t always or even often align. Moreover, what people believe about the motivations of the actions taken by others is a more powerful influence on their response, whether or not their belief is warranted.

Many historians, especially those dealing with colonialism and slavery, do not want to settle for just dealing with visible action, precisely because they’re studying circumstances where people are kept from acting in ways that they might wish to act. If, for example, the question of whether Africans objected violently to colonial rule in the 1930s rests on “did they carry out violent resistance?”, the answer might be, “Only in a few places or circumstances did they object enough to sustain violent resistance.” Similarly, you might conclude that slaves in the antebellum United States did not object to slavery with sufficient force to engage in slave rebellions. For a long time, historians have been very unsatisfied with those conclusions, and have sought to demonstrate how a host of other, smaller kinds of resistance were a better guide to the consciousness of colonial subjects or slaves.

For me, one strong concrete example for exploring these issues in modern Africa are the episodes of religious unrest and rebellion across central and southern Africa connected with the Watchtower movement (and similar movements like the Kimbanguists in the Belgian Congo). Karen Fields wrote a useful book (with a useful theoretical introduction) on this subject in 1985, and there’s other readings out there (primary and scholarly) that can extend the discussion from Fields’ analysis. What did the adherents think they were doing? Does it matter whether they intended to resist colonial rule if colonial administrators thought that they intended to resist and acted accordingly? What does it mean that movements with similar organizational structure and character in this region have persisted since the colonial era and arguably also predate it?

There are lots of other clusters or nodes of scholarly and primary material that help to get at these questions. But until we have real artificial intelligence of some kind, this is the kind of knowledge that a Google-driven world still can’t readily provide merely for the asking.

Posted in Academia, Africa, Information Technology and Information Literacy | 5 Comments

Colonial Africa: A List of Questions

I think I’ve hit on a catchy structure for a modest reshuffling of my Honors seminar in Colonial Africa. Much of my reading list will remain the same, but this restructuring is designed to make the way I look at the historiography much more concrete and transparent to the students. Basically, I want to organize the syllabus in terms of what strike me as the Big Questions that sustain historical and anthropological study of the colonial and postcolonial periods. I’m not sure that for each week there’s a single major book or article that will frame an answer to the question: these questions operate at different scales and with different degrees of historiographical density.

I’m curious to hear whether there are other questions you’d add to the list, or variant formulations of them that you prefer.

Keep in mind that one thing I really want to explore in my seminar is the metaquestion of whether colonialism per se was important or powerful in shaping 20th Century Africa. I want to stay open to the school of thought that suggests that there are other transformative influences that have been far more powerful (capitalism, “modernity”), to the school of thought that suggests that it’s actually the prior integration of African societies into global structures between 1450 and 1850 that’s more powerful, and to the school of thought that suggests that deep indigenous structures (political, environmental, social, cultural) remain more determinative of daily life and social outcomes in contemporary African societies than influences from the past century.

A lot of these questions can be answered well with skeptical reformulations. E.g., you could say in response to the question, “Why were European societies able to subject African societies to formal colonial rule with such rapidity?” that they weren’t able to do so, that the colonial state had little real authority outside of administrative centers for twenty or thirty years after lines were drawn on the map in Berlin, save for occasional displays of spectacular violence.

The more I think about it, the more I think that this list would also make a great premise for a catchy short book of essays. I’m feeling kind of pulled by the idea. This is kind of my worst habit, thinking of ideas for books rather than finishing almost-done ones, but I can’t really help myself.

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What was the state of African societies in 1860? Are there any useful generalizations to be made in response to that question? What was the relationship between African societies and larger global economic and political systems in 1860?

Why did the “Scramble for Africa” happen? Why were European societies able to subject African societies to formal colonial rule with such rapidity?

Did the activities and character of global capitalism within Africa change markedly after the Scramble for Africa, and was that a consequence of colonialism if so?

Did colonial authorities exercise meaningful political and social control over African societies after 1880, and if so, what kind of control? How did colonial administration actually work, and to what ends did it work? Did the purpose or function of colonial rule change over time?

How did the social structure of African societies change during the colonial era? How much of that change was directly attributable to colonialism itself?

How comparable were the experiences of different African societies during the colonial era? Did the nationality of the colonizer make a significant difference? Did the nature of colonial authority vary for other reasons? Did African societies become more alike or similar in the first half of the 20th Century?

Does the nature of colonial rule in Africa pose special historiographical or methodological problems for historical study?

How did the content and character of cultural practice and everyday life change during the colonial era, and how much was colonialism responsible for that change?

How did Africans think about or understand colonialism? How important was it to them? What social and political developments in African societies were primarily a response to or critique of colonial authority?

What are the social and political origins of African nationalism? How did it relate to other social and political movements in Africa during the “high imperial” era from 1919-1945?

Why did formal colonial rule in Africa come to an end after World War II?

What primarily shaped the evolution of the postcolonial state and postcolonial African societies in the first two decades of independence? (1960-1980)? Did the relationship between African societies and the global system change significantly during that period?

Why has much of postcolonial Africa suffered a series of recurrent political, economic and social catastrophes since 1980? Are all of those problems and failures in fact linked or connected?

Are colonial and postcolonial useful or meaningful periodizations of African history?

Posted in Africa | 9 Comments