Grubeus Shagrid, At Your Service

Low-energy day today: I spent a good part of yesterday playing the part of Shagrid, distant cousin to Hagrid of Harry Potter fame, convening an American expansion of the famous Hogwarts School. This was the consequence of my daughter’s request for a themed birthday party. One thing I discovered: it’s hard to find a fake beard in the middle of January. Another thing I discovered: if you spray-paint a grey wig brown, it will smell so toxic even after drying for three days that you won’t be able to wear it. A third thing: magic potions made from vinegar and baking soda are surprisingly sticky when they overflow and then dry on the dining room floor. But it was good fun.

My mom happened to bring along some of my old schoolwork from first through third grades. Reading through a stapled-together volume of “Monster Stories” I wrote from when I was nine, I came across the following, in between various stories about monsters robbing banks, pushing other monsters off cliffs, and getting into arguments with witches. See if you can guess what year it was.

——————–

Monster News

MONSTERGATE

President Monster has tapes!
They could be the answer.

Posted in Domestic Life | 3 Comments

One-A-Day, David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin, eds., History of Central Africa Volume 1

Students looking at the piles of books strewn over my desk, my windowsill, my bookshelves and my floor sometimes understate things a bit and say, “You have a lot of books”. (One reason I don’t really want to move again, ever, is not just so I can avoid packing them but also so I can avoid the accusatory glare from movers.)

One thing I sometimes say in reply is, “Well, they’re the tools of my trade”. Truth to tell, there are some on the shelves that I haven’t opened in years, and maybe a few that it’s likely I’ll never open again. However, if they’re involved in my teaching in any manner, I tend to look at them a lot.

I’m guessing that many academics have a class of books that they frequently consult while preparing lectures or thinking about class discussions: books that concern areas of specialized knowledge that are not quite directly your own field but are quite close to it, that read very plainly and clearly, and that make minimal arguments or are theoretically unadorned while being informationally dense. Textbooks for specialists might be the best way to think of these works.

The Birmingham and Martin anthology is a great example of this kind of book. When I’m teaching precolonial Central Africa, I often pull it off the shelf to refresh my knowledge and prepare my lectures. I’m not familiar enough with various precolonial states or peoples in the region to rattle off details about them intuitively: keeping Fang, Azande, Mangbetu and so on clear from one another is important but I really have to get a refresher every couple of years. (Whereas most southern African states and ethnonyms I know without review because I make use of that history in my own writing as well as in teaching.)

Once upon a time, I’m sure that the editors and publishers of this volume and its companion modern volume hoped it might be adopted for undergraduate use. Maybe it was when it was in print. I haven’t used it myself as an undergraduate reading, because I think you need to know quite a lot before reading it to make good use of what it has to say. It has the problem that a lot of Africanist writing has when it comes to communicating with non-specialist American or European audiences: little or no prior experience with the subject matter makes retaining names, details, and places very difficult.

It is the kind of writing that I think specialists should be writing for other specialists, though: a concise review of specialized knowledge about some basic or fundamental subject area. Effectively, a high-level Wikipedia, written just for us. No intent to resolve major disputes or stake an original claim (though all the authors in the Birmingham and Martin volume were picked because at the time, they were known as scholars who had made original research findings about the history of particular regions or states within Central, East and Southern Africa).

Posted in Africa, Books, The Mixed-Up Bookshelves | Comments Off on One-A-Day, David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin, eds., History of Central Africa Volume 1

Now You Know, and Knowing Is Half the Battle

Geeky Mom gets two things right about the recent Frontline special about children’s use of the Internet. First, that some of the parents shown in the show have no one to blame but themselves for not knowing what their kids are up to online, and second, that the program largely sought to play up to the fears of those parents in a time-honored, well-tested fashion.

As with children’s television, radio, mass-printed books, cave paintings and storytelling at the dawn of human history, the basic solution is literacy and conversation. Not for the kids, for the parents. You want to know what your kid is up to on MySpace? Know what MySpace is. Have a MySpace page. Make a family culture. That’s not just so you can understand your kid: it’s about an enduring new mode of literacy that is powerfully distributed through every aspect of your life already, even if you don’t know it or don’t care to know it. (I’d go off on a tangent about humanistic academics and their lamentably low levels of digital literacy here, but I’ll save that for another day.) If you try to gain some digital literacy to understand your child’s world, you’ll be doing yourself a big favor as well.

The Frontline producer who shows up in the thread at Geeky Mom agrees that the Internet is a double-edged sword. I agree: one edge is knowledge and the other edge is ignorance. The Internet has two sides the way that all communication and representation and expressive culture have two sides. The technologically unique dimensions of digital culture have very little to do with the issues that most concern ignorant parents about online use by contemporary teenagers. Your teenager is keeping secrets from you? Heavens to Murgatroyd, that never happened back when we just had typewriters and television. People are writing bad things on the Internet? I never heard of a book with dangerous or disturbing content which happened to find its way into the hands of people under the age of 18. Sexual deviants are looking for children online? I guess the flashers and predators that were around when I was a kid were time-travellers from the digital future. Kids are looking at online pr0n? I guess I’m just imagining that the 13-year old boys in my junior high noticed the Cheryl Tiegs fishnet-bathing-suit issue of Sports Illustrated in the school library and helpfully passed it around potlatch style for a couple of months before the librarians caught on.

There are many genuinely novel capacities, abilities, and forms that digital technologies create or permit, some of which really are culturally transformative, sometimes jarringly so. But the “Won’t somebody think of the CHILDRENS??????” stuff strikes me as largely coming from a much more historically established infrastructure of moral panic and public anxiety about family, media and modern life.

It could be worse. At least the Frontline people are in there talking about the show, agree there are two sides to the coin, and actually care about things like facts. When the same kind of narrative gets in the hands of media producers who no longer have any sense of shame or any residual connection to the world as it actually is, you get something roughly like this Fox News segment on the game Mass Effect. What I love about the segment is that the poor guy from SpikeTV can straightforwardly say, “You’re simply wrong, and here’s the ways in which you’re factually wrong” and it doesn’t slow either the Fox newscaster or their pet “expert” Cooper Lawrence down for even a microsecond. She says, “You play as a man and the purpose of the game is seeking out women for sex”. He says, “Actually, you can be male or female and the discreetly sexual scene in the game is about 2 minutes long in a 3 to 4 hour experience”. They don’t even pause, on with the show. (I noticed looking at the Amazon reviews of Lawrence’s book that there are at least some reputational consequences to annoying the hell out of gamers, though I’m guessing that Amazon is going to remove most of those reviews. That, too, is another topic to take up soon in a separate entry.)

I’d love for digital literacy to progress far enough and fast enough across a number of spectrums that we could begin to have a public conversation about the real issues and choices it presents, rather than things like “it’s like kids have their own private world” and “I hear tell that there’s one of them video games where a kid could have sex or sumpin like that”.

Update: Cooper Lawrence confesses. Don’t hold your breath expecting Fox News to do the same.

Posted in Blogging, Games and Gaming, Information Technology and Information Literacy | 14 Comments

One-A-Day: Alexander Galloway, Gaming: Essays in Algorithimic Culture

Remember: these aren’t reviews. If I were reviewing Galloway’s Gaming, I’d spend a long while talking about why I like much of it, and think it works very well alongside similar works of critical theory applied to games and digital culture by Ian Bogost and McKenzie Wark. One of the old criticisms made by “ludological” scholars doing formalist criticism of games about scholars approaching games from the perspective of critical theory, media studies and film theory was simply that they didn’t know anything about games. Once upon a time, that had more than a little truth to it. When you read Bogost, Wark and Galloway, you can see that the debate, if such it is, has moved well past that point, because they’re thinking clearly about what kinds of “texts” games really are in the context of critical theory.

There is one thing that I wanted to discuss in this shorter, non-review context, however. I’m really taking Galloway’s work as an example of a wider pattern in humanistic scholarship, so it should be understood that what I’m going to say is not just applicable to him.

Rather than complain about jargon per se, what bothers me a little is the largely aesthetic need in critical theory to produce terminological and conceptual novelty in order to authenticate the labor of producing theory. It’s a formal characteristic of some theory-work that runs very deep. James Miller’s Lingua Franca essay “Is Bad Writing Necessary?: George Orwell, Theodor Adorno and the Politics of Literature” is still one of the best, concise treatments of some of these questions. (For all that Lingua Franca sometimes featured weakly reported pieces, I really miss it.)

You would think it would be enough to write some short, clever essays on gaming and digital culture that integrated theoretical insights where appropriate. The problem in terms of building academic reputation capital is that it’s not clear where the specialization or expertise enters into that, or what would distinguish essays by a scholarly critic of digital culture from, say, Steven Poole’s Trigger Happy. My answer would be, in the sense of Miller’s article, Orwellian: what would distinguish the work of the academic is that it is intellectual, not that it is expert. In other words, it’s sufficient to be smart and to write well, that is to say, clearly.

Galloway’s book is smart, has novel insights, and is often (to me, at least), written clearly. The frustration I have is first that Galloway regards theory as something which requires the creation of a technical vocabulary and second that he seems to think that in order to make a contribution which establishes his academic credentials as a theorist in this area, he must fashion that vocabulary himself. (Wark and Bogost do some of this as well, as do critical theorists writing about most forms or genres.)

So, for example, his argument that video games are actions? Completely legitimate, important, useful. His argument that they are algorithimic cultural objects, and thus, that video games in certain ways have more in common with spreadsheets than checkers? Also important. His use of diegetic and nondiegetic, borrowed from film theory? Ok by me, though here I think the vocabulary is beginning to be more about establishing credibility with a chosen set of academic peers than delivering analysis which can only come through this particular terminology.

Galloway’s insistence that this all adds up to a distinctive body of gamic theory? This is where I feel as if something’s going on that doesn’t need to go on, and it’s going on in a fashion that’s has a sort of excess performativity that grates on me. Start with that word: “gamic”. It’s not just that it has the inelegance that theoretical neologisms often have, that harsh-sounding quality that is meant to emulate the unnatural technical sound of much scientific vocabulary. It’s that there’s already a term which Galloway studiously ignores. Not argues against, except in a single footnote: interactive. Yes, sure, I know that a theorist could find a million ways to talk about why that term is misleading, inaccurate, and so on. This is what Galloway does in one footnote. (Not for the first time, I’m struck that critical theory sometimes has a back-door empiricism in the way it coins and dismisses terms and words, as if the goal of a particular term is to provide a fully mimetic match to a particular specific textual or expressive phenomenon.) But it’s there, it has a reasonably good common-language sound to it, and it’s already in use.

What Galloway does isn’t just prefer his own word, gamic. (Which, I was surprised to find, has another existing meaning: a product or consequence of sex.) He declares theory as if he is inaugurating or inventing it. “Begin like this”, he writes, “If photographs are images, and films are moving images, then video games are actions. Let this be word one for video game theory.” (p. 2) You read that and wonder if he remembered to pick up a few extra tablets of God’s Commandments while he was up on the mountaintop. Sure, eventually some of the standard names will be dropped, both on games (Callois and Huizinga) and on theory (Deleuze, Geertz, Derrida). But the essays work hard, especially the first, to perform the role of theory-creator, and to convey sufficient austerity and distance in the relation between the medium and the critic. There’s even the de rigeur exaltation of “countergaming” at the end: no work of high theory about an existing form is complete if it doesn’t wish for that existing form to be displaced by avant-garde alternatives which disrupt the complicit character of a culture-industry mass-medium and therefore aim to produce true art. (Though he makes a great point that most “serious games” or art-games attempt to dissent from the games industry “through a lapse back to other media entirely” [p. 126].)

Again, don’t get me wrong. The essay on the cinematic origins of the first-person shooter is terrific, and the treatment of “allegories of control” in sandbox games is also incredibly useful and insightful. Everything in the book is good and important, and Galloway is very much a peer to Wark, Bogost and others writing on the theory of digital games. But it just seems to me that there is a way to write theory with rhetorical humility, to get down into the trenches with audiences, and to not make neologism and conceptual invention the defining attribute of theoretical contribution.

[I made a slight change to this entry a short while after posting it to note that Galloway does have one footnote dealing with the term interactivity, in which he pretty much performs that back-door empiricism: e.g., that the problem with interactivity is that it’s not accurate to the reality of games.]

Posted in Books, Games and Gaming, The Mixed-Up Bookshelves | 7 Comments

Liberal Arts Poster Children

I was thinking last week, after another discussion of assessment, about what I would regard as a successful product of a liberal arts education. If I don’t want to have a test of a fixed body of knowledge, but I agree that we ought to have benchmarks, what represents the bull’s eye? I figure that if you can identify a successful embodiment of the liberal arts in professional and personal life, and the person who represents that successful standard feels that the content of their education produced ways of thinking about the world that led to that success, you might have a better idea about what kinds of courses and teaching approaches would favor that ultimate goal.

If I had to identify people who most absolutely represent the highest ideals of a liberal arts education, I would start with the hosts of the television show Mythbusters.

If you’re not familiar with the show, the basic premise is that they take a commonly held belief or a commonly repeated cultural trope and try to concretely test its plausibility using some version of the scientific method. This can range from “is it actually easy to shoot fish in a barrel?” to “Could James Bond really have blown up a propane tank with a pistol at 20 yards and escape intact in the movie Casino Royale?”

The show does a very good job of showcasing how they approach testing each of these myths, about the thought-process that goes into designing a test, and about the concrete use of skills and improvisational adaptation to deal with various real-world issues involved in a test. Naturally, it’s skewed towards technical and scientific skills, but the hosts also have to deal with humanistic and social questions ranging from “what are the historical or cultural origins of this particular myth (and thus, what is it that we’re actually trying to test)?” to evaluating what makes for a persuasive or meaningful test of a particular concept. If you wanted to teach someone about the core commitments underlying the scientific method, about six episodes of Mythbusters might do about as well as a semester studying the philosophy of science: they do a marvelous job of walking the audience through a reasoning process and underscoring the place of skepticism in that process.

In many ways, I’d love to feel that any graduate of Swarthmore could potentially make a valid contribution to a project undertaken in a spirit like that of Mythbusters, and figure out what you would need to do on the educational side to make that happen. There is no required subject that I would insist upon.

Jamie Hyneman, one of the MythBusters hosts, put it better than I could hope to: “You can’t expect to teach someone everything he or she needs to know. A broad foundation of experience allows you to extrapolate things with which you have no direct experience. Specialists are usually in danger of not seeing the forest for the trees. If you acquire both a broad foundation and deep knowledge in a specific thing, you become much more dynamic in that area. If one takes both of these things to extremes, something truly transcendental can happen. In my case, my college education was not specifically useful to me later, but it had an effect on me in fundamental ways that were very major in the long run.”

Hyneman, it turns out, studied Russian languages and literatures. Of the other people in the show, one graduated from film school, one with an unspecified major but who had a career after graduation as an artist, one graduated with a major in electrical engineering, and one dropped out from drama school. So I don’t think they necessarily demonstrate that to live the liberal arts, you have to study them. Their careers after school are a better demonstration of how to live the liberal arts. Hyneman has done a wild range of things in his life, as has Adam Savage. The other three main MythBusters turned their different educational experiences towards work in the film industry, specifically in special effects.

So that’s what I think is worth looking at: how to match a liberal arts education with liberal arts outcomes. I don’t think it’s true that you simply don’t need any such thing, that you should just dive into life and do stuff. But a liberal arts curriculum could be much more about diving in than it often is, much more about making use of knowledge, much more about building and making and testing. If you were the president of a liberal arts college, I think you could do a lot worse than sitting down with Jamie Hyneman, paying him a consultant’s fee, and asking him, “How would you build a curriculum designed to train a MythBuster?” If I were sitting on top of some Mellon or MacArthur money, that might be what I’d do with it before I paid for study groups and faculty workshops and so on.

Posted in Academia, Popular Culture, Swarthmore | 6 Comments

Strategic Admissions Limitations Talks?

I’m seeing and hearing some interesting discussions in a number of places about recent changes to the price structure of tuition at highly selective colleges and universities.

In today’s New York Times, Roger Lehecka and Andrew Delbanco criticize the Harvard-led shift towards discounting the price of a college education to families earning between $120,000 and $180,000 a year.

They make a number of interesting points, primarily that while Harvard, Yale and other wealthy institutions (including Swarthmore) can probably afford to spread the discounting that they already do for families earning under $120,000/year, many other institutions can’t afford to do so. Lehecka and Delbanco argue that what this will probably force those less wealthy institutions to do is cut the level of support they provide to poor students.

The authors don’t go any further with that line of thought, but you could argue that the strategy for less wealthy private colleges and universities would be to aggressively target academic underachievers from wealthy and upper-middle-class families and to sweeten the deal for the latter group by negotiating limited discounts, while shedding most or all low-income applicants on the grounds that they’re unaffordable. In short, to become institutions skewed to giving wealthy ne’er-do-wells the certification necessary to have continued access to professional-class employment.

What Lehecka and Delbanco don’t discuss is the possibility of some other trade-off for less wealthy private institutions. Part of the problem is that many universities and colleges basically offer the same package of services in more or less the same conventional forms.

There is a big difference between a small undergraduate-only college and a large research university in terms of how education is delivered. That difference holds whether we’re talking about extremely wealthy institutions or not, all the way down the line. There are arguments to be made on behalf of either of those modes of education. I preferred the small approach as a student, and I honestly prefer it also as a teacher, but there are students and ambitions better served at a large research institution.

Within a given institutional type, however, there is actually a remarkable similarity of form and approach at the level of curricular design and services offered. Each institution uses marketing literature to highlight its major sources of distinctiveness, like Swarthmore’s Honors program or Reed’s focus on individualized senior research projects. But these are like shiny decorations on top of a basically similar cake. The big difference, in the end, is the relative wealth of a given institution: that’s what determines how big and lustrous and tasty the cake really is. Swarthmore can support the range of subjects and favorable student-faculty ratio that it has because in the end, that’s what it spends its considerable money doing: having a curriculum that’s unusually wide for the small size of the institution without using large lecture courses or adjunct instructors as the primary vehicle for delivering that curriculum.

Less wealthy institutions could make a different choice than throwing poorer students overboard in order to discount tuition to less academically qualified but financially attractive upper-middle class students. They could aim to live in the “long tail” of the education marketplace. Right now, there are relatively few selective colleges and universities that try to deliver a strongly distinctive kind of education. Hampshire and St. John’s College are often cited as examples. There are other variants out there: colleges and universities that strongly skew to service-learning or community-based learning, for example. Art schools and conservatories are another great example, one that works at several scales of institutional wealth. I tend to think of MIT and Caltech as “long tail” institutions in the best possible way: rather than build a curriculum that’s aimed to satisfy any and all possible enrolled students, they’ve made a very clear-headed decision to be exceptionally strong in particular areas, and tailor whatever is left over to their institutional strengths, and then to admit only applicants whose aspirations and skills fit with the institution’s design.

That’s a road that’s open to less wealthy institutions as well. Rather than trying to emulate the “all services and subjects for all students”, make a conscious decision to be a particular kind of institution strongly servicing only one approach or philosophy or curricular area. Otherwise, they’re stuck trying to pretend that a Yugo is a Mercedes-Benz.

Part of the issue here is also the desperate extent to which everyone, even the selective institutions, are locked into a helpless follow-the-leader mode. No one wants to be the first to look different in an unfavorable (or maybe even favorable) light, for fear of being the mole whose head is above ground long enough to get whacked by parents and prospectives. It’s a bit like the Cold War: the superpowers are, deliberately or otherwise, spending everyone else into the ground.

You could argue that wealthy institutions owe their less wealthy competitors some extra consideration, and shouldn’t undertake changes in their pricing that put those less wealthy institutions in an unfavorable light. But by that token, wealthy institutions shouldn’t offer better services, pay faculty better, or do anything which distinguishes them or makes differential use of their relative wealth. Instead, they should just create a revenue-sharing system that distributes money evenly across all private institutions. (There have been some people who’ve suggested that this is exactly what should happen.) I don’t see anything appealing about that idea, and not just because I’m working for a wealthy institution and benefitting accordingly. All that would do is aggravate the homogeneity in the educational marketplace that’s already something of a problem about a thousand times more severely. We’d go from a market with Chevys trying to pretend to be Benzes alongside actual Benzes to a market with nothing but Trabants.

The wealthy institutions could probably do a lot more to shoulder the responsibility of social mobility, to work harder to bring in first-generation college students. To a significant extent, I’d like to see Swarthmore and all of its peers shift some of the efforts we presently put into pursuing diversity across a very wide range into the dedicated pursuit of qualified applicants who would be first-generation college students, to look at economic diversity as Job #1. A lot of lower-income families don’t even consider sending their children to what look like very expensive schools, even if their children are qualified applicants, because they look at the price tag and figure it’s unaffordable. What they don’t know is that at most of the wealthy institutions, a qualified applicant from a low-income family is likely to be admitted for no cost at all. This is what the sticker price hides from the public. Elite colleges and universities charge on a sliding scale, essentially. “Financial aid” could just as easily be described as “bargain price”: it’s as if you walked into a store, brought a product to the cash register, and your price was determined by your income level. If an applicant’s family is below, at or even near the poverty line, it’s going to be free.

Of course, however much elite colleges might pursue such qualified students, they’re in short supply because of deeper inequities in public education in the United States, and because of all the consequences of structural poverty to children in terms of their ability to achieve academically. Leave aside for the moment the underlying causes of that: the fact is that there is a limited supply of such students unless elite universities and colleges are also prepared to make internal changes to the way they deliver education to try and compensate for weak preparation on behalf of marginally qualified students. For various reasons, I don’t think that’s necessarily a good idea, but it’s definitely worth discussing openly and clearly as a further direction to go.

However, even before that issue arises, I think it’s clear that wealthy institutions that are slightly less well-known than Harvard, Yale, and Princeton could probably do more (perhaps collaboratively) to explain how pricing and eligibility really work, and to pursue first-generation or economically disadvantaged students in communities where knowledge about higher education may not be well-distributed, where all that families know is that it looks like it costs a lot of money to go to college.

I think the answer for less wealthy institutions isn’t to either keep up with the Joneses or complain bitterly about the inequity of Harvard’s tuition initiatives. It’s to get out of the game of trying to be all things to all possible students, to drop services and curriculum not because of a need to indiscriminately economize but because of a strategic, deliberate decision to specialize or seek distinction in some highly specific area or philosophical approach. Frankly, I think the wealthier institutions could use a shot of this kind of thinking, too.

Posted in Academia, Swarthmore | 9 Comments

One-A-Day, Tsuneo Yoshikuni, African Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Social History of Harare Before 1925

I have a tendency to oversell the value of a generalist approach to academic work, partly to try and defend my own practices and interests.

I genuinely think that many specialist monographs fail to make a case for their importance, inflate a journal-length analysis to a whole book, or restate something that’s already known in a less comprehensible and accessible manner. In any event, the academic ecosystem seems badly out of whack in its preference for specialized monographs.

It would be a genuine tragedy, however, if highly specialized scholarly books did not continue to be written. I can’t think of a better example of the value and importance of this form than Tsuneo Yoshikuni’s posthumously published book African Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe. Moreover, it’s the kind of book I would hand to any colleague interested in the history of urbanization or labor history, regardless of their era and place of focus, despite the fact that the book is so minutely focused on such a precise subject (the Zimbabwean city of Harare from 1890 to 1925).

Being directed to Yoshikuni’s unpublished doctoral dissertation (essentially the same manuscript as this book) was something of a rite of passage for historians and anthropologists studying Zimbabwe in the 1990s. It seems to me that many specialized fields have something like this: the brilliant unpublished dissertation, or the stand-alone article that never became part of a later book.

The book is tersely written, which is a part of its virtue. There’s no mucking about here with grand theory or scholarly turf battles. But neither is the book just workmanlike tedium, or what I sometimes dismiss as “fill in the gaps” history.

Essentially, Yoshikuni decided to look very carefully at something that previous historians had assumed they knew about, namely, how urbanization happened after 1890 in the colonial capital, Salisbury, eventually renamed Harare after the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980. What he found was something rather different from the common assumption.

First, he argued that in the earliest years of rule by white settlers in Southern Rhodesia (initially the colony was controlled by the British South Africa Company, until 1923), some Africans took up in peri-urban areas around the new capital city in order to maximize their autonomy from governmental control but also in shrewd pursuit of the opportunities provided by the colonial economy, and in turn managed to reinvest some of the capital they accumulated in their children’s education or in other economic enterprises.

Here Yoshikuni was seeing something that has increasingly become visible to other historians of southern Africa, that the initial response of some Africans to colonial conquest or to partial integration into a global political economy was in fact quite dynamic and inventive. A lot of that response wasn’t squashed at the outset of colonial conquest, but only much later, often because white farmers or businessmen were feeling the pinch of successful competition from Africans, or were trying to find ways to make their own marginal enterprises less marginal through a racial monopoly enforced by the white administration. This is a very different story than the older narrative, “Africans living within their own economic and social systems, then violently wrenched all in one motion from their own systems into a monolithic colonial system that subjugated them at every turn”. At least some of the peri-urban people that Yoshikuni describes were responding with creativity and energy to the changes that came with colonialism, and were brutally cheated or denied later on.

This seems to me also a big part of the social history of African nationalism, not just in Zimbabwe but also elsewhere. The generation of nationalists who became rulers of independent African nations often had to burnish their populist credentials and their ideologies in order to appear as if they were a part of the masses they aspired to lead, but a great many of them seem to me to have instead been successful aspirants who “bought in” to much of the colonial social order but believed that “civilized men” such as themselves would eventually given the respect and position that their accomplishments and skills warranted. As young people, some of them believed in the promises of European liberalism that were in most respects wholly absent from European empire in Africa, and when the fact of unending racial supremacy was shoved into their faces, they then turned sharply towards nationalism of one sort or another.

There’s another aspect of African nationalism that Yoshikuni discovered in the early history of Harare. In Zimbabwe, as in much of colonial Africa, African nationalism became a strong political force when aspirants and elites joined up with some kind of popular or mass political movement after the Second World War. Yoshikuni looks at the early origins of this kind of popular sentiment in Harare and what he finds is that some of the strongest roots were in long-settled households and neighborhoods composed of “migrants” from outside of the borders of Southern Rhodesia, chiefly from present-day Malawi and Zambia.

This part of Yoshikuni’s book helped me make sense of some of my own experiences in Zimbabwe in the early 1990s. I went to a number of soccer games with a small group of men that I met when I went to the main beer hall in Mbare, the oldest township built for African residents during the colonial era. They all spoke chiNyanja, a language spoken primarily north of the Zambezi River, and it turned out in fact that many of them had families living in Malawi. But they were very long-term and well-settled migrants, if that would be the right word for them, as they had lived and worked in Zimbabwe most of their adult lives, had some family members in Harare itself, and in two cases, their fathers and grandfathers had lived in Harare in the same house. That isn’t a history that was well-understood during the colonial era, nor was it a history that most Zimbabwean nationalists were keen to tell. As Yoshikuni lays it out, it was many of these urban residents who moved towards mass protest after 1925, rather than the rural chiShona and Ndebele “sons of the soil” whom later nationalist leaders would exalt.

This is a book that speaks softly and carefully, and so it’s easy to mistake what a thorough revision it is quietly performing on the received history not just of Zimbabwe but of African nationalism, migrant labor, urbanization and much else in southern Africa as a whole. It might sound as if no one besides a specialist should care about that revision, but I think this is a case where enough subsidence in the fine detailed underpinnings of the general synthesis ought to lead to some radically new ways of telling the overall story. If Africans weren’t uniformly subjugated to colonial domination from the first second of its imposition, but in some cases, responded dynamically as entrepreneurs and aspirants, that’s a new story with some important implications. If it turns out that many labor migrants were at first opportunistically responding to urban and peri-urban life rather than responding to compulsion directed at desperate peasantries, that’s a twist.

If some of the popular underpinnings of labor unrest and nationalist organizing came from people who weren’t technically “of the nation”, and moreover, settled urbanites rather than peasantries, that ought to force a rethinking of the nation itself, even down to its deepest conceptional roots. One of the biggest problems with the nation-state in postcolonial Africa isn’t so much the “artificial borders” often decried by outsiders and Africans alike. It’s with a conception of the nation as unified and rooted in the essential character of a native “people”. The real pluralism of circumstance and identity that went into anti-colonial movements really only comes into view with the kind of careful, minute work of a scholar like Yoshikuni.

Posted in Africa, Books, The Mixed-Up Bookshelves | 10 Comments

One-A-Day: John Wright, Fugitives of Chaos

I feel like finding new authors to like in genre fiction can be quite difficult. You know who you already like, but the marketing of work by new authors often makes them seem either as if they’re derivative of someone you like (and therefore suspect) or totally unlike anyone you like (and therefore suspect).

I do a lot of my book buying through Amazon, but one thing I still do in the bookstore is go up and down the science-fiction section to see if there are titles, authors, book covers or even spines that look unfamiliar. You have to do it somewhat often because the average Borders doesn’t keep newer work in stock for very long unless it hits big right at the start. I make a certain amount of “spec buys” of SF and fantasy paperbacks so that I don’t miss the first book in a series that I come to like, or end up having to chase down earlier work by an author who gets some reputation. Once I like someone, I tend to buy most of what they do up to the point that it starts to be seriously bad in some fashion. (Say, the way that certain famous SF authors start to churn out really weak stuff, sometimes with co-authors or ghosts, as they get near the end of the road. I appreciate all the stuff you’ve written that I’ve loved, folks, but let’s keep the memories happy, k?)

John Wright is one of the “new” authors I found this way. (Probably the better and cheaper way to do it is read genre short stories imore regularly, but for some reason, I’ve never found SF and fantasy short stories that satisfying, with some notable exceptions.) I really loved his trilogy that began with The Golden Age and ended The Golden Transcendence. His second series, a contemporary fantasy that begins with The Last Guardian of Everness, was also a good read.

So I grabbed his new book, Orphans of Chaos, with eagerness. And I stuck with it through Fugitives of Chaos, the sequel.

I really should like these books. I like the author’s previous work, and they have some of the same mix of dense intellectual referents, lightly postmodern self-referentiality, and conceptual inventiveness. Plus they focus on mythology, in particular Greek mythology, which I’ve been a sucker for in speculative fiction ever since I read the D’Aulaires Book of Greek Myths. I should like them, so I made myself work through them. (Normally I give up fairly quickly on genre fiction that isn’t working for me.)

Why don’t they work? In the most basic sense, because there simply isn’t much of a plot. If a work of speculative writing is going to throw some of the craftsmanlike pleasures of disposable fiction overboard, it had better have some other kind of aesthetic tricks and compensations to offer me. In two books, the basic narrative of this series has scarcely advanced: the first two books substantially repeat the same elements. In the first, the lead characters uncover some of the secrets of their own identity, plot an escape, and are recaptured, whereupon all but one of them has their memory reset. In the second, the lead characters uncover the secrets of their identity (though one of them remembers previous events), learn a few mildly new things about what’s going on behind the scenes, plot an escape and appear to escape successfully. Along the way, there’s also some weirdly squicky stuff going on about sex and bondage where I can’t really tell what Wright thinks he’s doing, exactly.

More importantly, however, a huge amount of both books is delivered in the form of an internal monologue, in huge gobs of tedious exposition. That exaggerates the lack of incident and action, and it’s all the worse because the protagonist is either tedious or lacking altogether in an internally consistent character.

I think that’s the key problem, in the end. It took me a while to figure out what was really bugging me. The lead characters are mythological beings who are being kept as secure hostages to prevent the outbreak of an apocalyptic war between two major mythological factions. Wright can’t really settle on a distinctive individual personality for his protagonist or on a kind of stable “cultural” sense of who his characters are. They mix antiquarian and high literary references with contemporary pop culture and fantasy references in a way that never feels convincing or consistent. His gods and monsters don’t seem to live in the world, among mortals, the way that sometimes is the case in contemporary fantasy. (As in the somewhat-Potter-derivative but entertaining Percy Jackson books, for example.) But their cultural and psychological referents are often drawn from human history and contemporary society.

In the end, this is what even low-intensity world creation is about in fantasy. It’s not necessarily about the full-monty Tolkienesque population of a consistent alternative world with languages, architectures, histories, cartographies and the like. It’s about establishing some parameters for the characters so that they make sense, so that we can relate their internal histories as beings to some kind of external milieu. You don’t have to do that for me if I’m reading about middle-age ennui in suburban America, and you don’t have to do that for me if I’m reading a fantasy that straightforwardly recycles established tropes. (No need to explain to me what a wise old wizard, a young hero and a wisecracking sidekick think about a dark lord up the road who is terrorizing the local yeomanry, for example.) You do have to do that for me if you’re consciously intending to mix things up a bit, unless your fiction is so self-referentially postmodern that it is deliberately eschewing niceties like setting, characters and plot in favor of metacommentary of some kind. Wright’s not doing that either in these books.

I’ll still be back in the bookstore buying up Wright’s next series of books, but unusually for me, I’m two books into this trilogy and it’s over and out for me.

Posted in Books, Popular Culture, The Mixed-Up Bookshelves | 1 Comment

Historians For Messy Desks

I’ve been trying to keep an open mind about the primaries. Among other reasons, because as a registered independent, I can’t vote in them anyway in Pennsylvania.

But everyone has their tipping point, and mine kind of just tipped over to Obama. Reason? The sparring over Obama’s “messy desks” comment at the debate.

It’s no secret around Swarthmore that I have a legendarily messy desk. It works for me, and since it’s mine, that’s really all that matters.

But the spin on the remark coming out of the Clinton campaign really makes me sick. Try Noam Scheiber on for size. Normally you don’t see that kind of straining unless someone’s severely constipated.

The Clinton spin reinforces my fear that she is the fourth coming of Dukakis/Gore/Kerry’s exaltation of technocracy, not to mention Carter’s tendency to micromanage obsessively. Obama’s basically right, in any event: the President is not the Chief of Staff. Bush hasn’t failed because he’s not wonking away late into the night. He’s failed because he surrounded himself with sycophants, axe-grinders, loose cannons and bureaucratic land-grabbers, because he made unquestioning loyalty a more important attribute for service to the executive than ability. He failed because he didn’t ask the big questions or seek a range of advice, not because he didn’t micromanage.

What warms me to Obama in this instance isn’t just his messy desk. It’s that when he was asked a human question (“What’s your greatest weakness”), he answered like a human being. For Scheiber and Clinton’s staffers, that’s somehow evidence that he’s not fit for the Presidency. As Obama pointed out today on NPR, Edwards and Clinton both gave almost freakishly political answers. (Edwards: my greatest weakness is that I care too much. Clinton: I get impatient with people who don’t care enough about the children!) Come on, if you were interviewing someone for a job, and you asked ye olden “greatest weakness” chestnut, what would you think of the kinds of answers that Clinton and Edwards gave? I’d immediately think I was talking with someone who was both phony and unimaginative.

Messy desks arise! You have nothing to lose but your politically hollow micromanagers!

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My Librarians Are Awesome

In the category of “best unexpected surprises ever” and also “why academics should blog”.

I posted my syllabi this fall on this blog. In one new course in particular, I’m using a bunch of new texts that I knew were mostly in the three-college catalog that we hold jointly with Bryn Mawr and Haverford. But I knew they were almost all held at the other two campuses.

This is not a really big deal. The libraries at the three campuses have made moving books around as convenient and hassle-free as possible. Still, it does mean that I can’t browse those books casually, that I have to one-by-one order them to come down here so I can make a scan of the short selections of material that I’m assigning from each. It means that there’s a one day delay, which isn’t so great if you’re like me and sometimes trying to prepare for teaching in a foresight-challenged manner. Even though I’m only giving students a small selection out of many of these books, I want to be able to look at the whole book myself while preparing for class.

It makes a practical difference in my ability to work well and smoothly to have a book I’m going to use heavily held here at Swarthmore. Once upon a time, the faculty here did most of the collection development, but for various reasons, they’re doing less of it than they used to. So what we get is sometimes less driven by particular planned usages in classrooms and research as a result. Our librarians have always been very obliging about ordering anything we want, but they’re not psychic.

Or are they???

Because here’s what our librarians did this December. Rather than waiting for me to get off my ass and actually order the books that I’m teaching from for our Swarthmore collection, they pulled off all the titles from my syllabi as posted to my blog and ordered them for me. Without me having to ask or beg. Just because it seemed like a good idea and a good way to help out. It’s like they knew that I would be sitting around grumbling in February, cursing my own inefficiency, festering in the stew of my own procrastination, mumbling about our monograph collection and my part in failing to develop it.

Isn’t that a one-hundred pound bag of pure awesome?

Posted in Academia, Information Technology and Information Literacy | 5 Comments