Comments on: Hearts and Minds https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/ Culture, Politics, Academia and Other Shiny Objects Fri, 24 Apr 2015 03:08:56 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.4.15 By: Alonzo https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/comment-page-1/#comment-72887 Fri, 24 Apr 2015 03:08:56 +0000 https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=2798#comment-72887 One of the most common ways of thinking of morality has been as something based on a foundation of religion. This has naturally led many to think that without religion people will inevitably fall into general immorality. “If there is no God, everything is permitted” and all that. But as a matter of observed fact, this is simply false. Danes are not conspicuously less moral than Alabamans. Some kind of error has been made, a mix-up between conceptualized foundations and the the actualities of life.

I suspect there is similar error at work here. Is our way of life really built on a foundation of universal Cartesian individual subject/object WEIRDness, some Modern Dispensation that everything rests on top of, so that any significant change in that foundation must have sweeping implications? Or could we dispense with that Dispensation while keeping most of the way of life, as the irreligious Danes retain so much of what was handed down to them from their pious forebears?

The purpose of foundations, in the conceptual sense, is usually to provide justification. When you have no need for justification you can abandon them. I think most of the elements of the Modern Dispensation are past the need for justification, they have what something more valuable, constituency. Take individual rights, for example. Once it may have seemed important to say that they were endowed by the Creator, or followed from Reason. But now that they are firmly established (where they are firmly established) there is little need for that, and hardly anyone cares. People keep hold on them, or fight to expand them, because they cherish them, or let them go because they don’t. Regardless of their historicity, fictionality, ideological impurity, or whatever.

One of the critiques of the Modern Dispensation — one I often find agreeable — focuses of a thin/thick distinction. You can see a (bad) example of this in Haidt — conservative morality is thicker (it uses more of his types!) than liberal morality, and this makes it better, somehow. Applied to rights, one can complain about how thin and abstract they are, cold and inhuman, compared to the thick and robust and living bonds that exist in some or other traditional society. But what this kind of critique will overlook is that though it may apply to modern thinking it does not apply to modern living, to modern peoples, who deploy and negotiate thin abstractions within the context of lives that are as thick as any others, as dense with meaning and phenomenological richness as any others. The modern way of living is robust, tightly networked and highly varied, and any assaults to its ideas, in all their tempting delicacy, will have a hard time having much effect on it. (This observation is commonplace among leftists, though they speak of Capitalism.) A few brain scans and experiments on undergraduates may have Free Will quivering in its boots, but the American legal system is made of far tougher stuff.

I do think science will reshape what it means to be human in terrifying ways, but not on the intellectual field of battle but on the technological one, from the outside in.

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By: lemmy caution https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/comment-page-1/#comment-72886 Thu, 23 Apr 2015 20:53:29 +0000 https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=2798#comment-72886 I really like his article the “emotional dog and the rational tail”:

https://www.motherjones.com/files/emotional_dog_and_rational_tail.pdf

His book “The Righteous Mind” is annoying.

Pinker’s theory in his violence book is that enlightened moral attitudes radiate from the university to europe/blue-states to red-states to third-world countries. It is a reassuringly pro-WEIRD theory . It also has the benefit that it doesn’t really require a lot of rationality. A little bit of it in the right place is good enough. Everybody else just falls in line like dominoes.

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By: CarlD https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/comment-page-1/#comment-72885 Thu, 23 Apr 2015 02:32:46 +0000 https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=2798#comment-72885 I want it. Freedom is the recognition of necessity.

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By: Raph Koster https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/comment-page-1/#comment-72883 Wed, 22 Apr 2015 01:09:35 +0000 https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=2798#comment-72883 Another way to put it: progressing through these levels of understanding, and yes, including the one where we realize what we really are, is just the process of the larger entity figuring itself out, and growing up.

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By: Raph Koster https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/comment-page-1/#comment-72882 Wed, 22 Apr 2015 01:08:13 +0000 https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=2798#comment-72882 Well, to draw upon a different vein of modern scientific thought, I tend to look at it through the lens of what complexity science is saying about complex webs. It’s an analogy and nothing more, but it can be helpful to think of these as brains or organisms, wherein each node is equivalent to a cell. Just as we have no real thoughts about paring our fingernails, so do societies spare little thought for wasted individual lives. Things like the entire Enlightenment can almost be thought of as just a passing thought. Wars are just how these larger scale entities “think.”

Again, it’s an analogy; there’s no claim towards “thought processes” for a city, or sentience for Gaia. But it does relate back to the quasi-mechanistic thoughts of an evopsych person, discussing the ways in which we are mostly unaware sacks of fluid, hostages to impulses we mostly rationalize.

There is something, then, to both Cartesian theories of mind and to the Enlightenment — they make our existence as a skin cell to be sloughed off somewhat more tolerable, and enable us to perhaps have a better time of it while here (hi ho, to Epicureanism we go). It may even be that these things are ‘thoughts’ that actually help the larger entity that frankly, we probably can’t comprehend any more than our fingernail understands the rest of us.

Thinking about humanity more than humans, about whether to privilege our existence or the system’s, and so on, lead to classic moral dilemmas, of course. Our ethical systems by and large have historically arrived at hodge-podge answers to those dilemmas, but with a gradual broad consensus developing that a broad consensus itself is the ultimate end. Complexity science would term that a phase transition. I know at least one who worries that if we actually get there, it’ll be the moment when we collectively realize that we never had free will in the first place, and actually lose our illusion of consciousness.

I prefer to think that maybe our fingers occasionally mourn our pared fingernails, and still imagine themselves sentient but fulfilling an important role in the polity that is our body. It gives a little bit of comfort. 🙂

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By: Timothy Burke https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/comment-page-1/#comment-72881 Tue, 21 Apr 2015 22:47:32 +0000 https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=2798#comment-72881 Right, but that leads us back into the maze that Haidt constructs but does not navigate. Why should we have ever built moral and social systems that lead us to regard what we are as monstrous? Unless there really is something, however partial or fragmented, to Cartesian theories of mind and personhood and to Enlightenment ideas about reason and justice?

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By: Raph Koster https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/blog/2015/04/21/hearts-and-minds-2/comment-page-1/#comment-72880 Tue, 21 Apr 2015 21:59:49 +0000 https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=2798#comment-72880 I suspect that when taken to logical conclusions, many of these trains of thought lead to what seem like monstrous places, in contemporary thought, and therefore simply do not get voiced.

But nature is often rather monstrous, by our ethical lights.

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