https://blogs.swarthmore.edu/burke/?p=533

To put it another way: if one argues that contesting religious truth claims is only a reformist project, that it doesn’t have to involve any especially profound transformation of existing society, that there is every reason to think that religious truth claims can be relatively easily turfed out of contemporary global societies, I think you one is arguing by implication that religious truth claims are not particularly sociohistorically embedded. I think you potentially could argue that. In fact, the argument I list as #6 above claims exactly this, that religious ideology is a superficial, highly plastic gloss that overlays deeper social, economic or political interests.

If, however, you accept that at least some religious truth claims, and the religions to which they are connected, are deeply embedded, then hoping to contest them successfully is by its nature a revolutionary project of some kind, unless you have a very long time frame in mind and you’re fairly sanguine about whether there’s any progress towards your goal.

There’s nothing vicious in that statement. I’m just saying that’s the facts. If I were a committed critic of the nation-state (and many are) and was determined to see new forms of sovereignty or territoriality replace it over time, I’d have to accept that I would be pushing for something that had a revolutionary scope or character, a major transformation of the world as it is.

Unless I was also going to argue that I’m not particularly serious in my criticism–that I’m just saying, “Hey, get rid of the nation-state”, with little interest in whether people are persuaded or not by that call.

My complain here is that I like your writing, except on this subject, where it goes past unfair and approaches something nasty. Notice that when reaching for an analogy for Dawkins’ project, instead of comparing it to, say, attempting to convince people that the solar system is heliocentric, or that disease doesn’t come from an imbalance of humors, you compare it to an attempt to overthrow the state. You consistently use violent imagery when describing Dawkins, and seem to ascribe violent aims to him. Dawkins’ “project” is to use convincing arguments to demonstrate that theism is a myth. He speaks and writes books. He’s the poster child for the Open Society.

It’s fair to complain that I gloss Dawkins based on his shorter public speeches and interviews on these topics, and I should read his more detailed work. But see my above comment: saying that you think religion is fine or acceptable in these respects *unless* it makes truth claims is arguably disentangling things that can’t be disentangled.

(On the evo-psych point, though–here I have read Dawkins at greater length, and I think he’s has the same problem that both evo-psych and memeticists have with explaining why *and* how we could or should think other than what we are evolved or adapted to think. Buss, for example, runs into a problem with explaining why we should follow other moral or social rules for sexual relations than those which he describes as EEA adaptations. Obviously the fact of arguing that we should think or act otherwise means they’re not determinists, but it’s not at all clear how they get away from being determinists. If rationality is a kind of escape hatch which allows us to choose to think or be differently, to supercede our evolutionary minds or behaviors, it’s not clear how evo-psych can so precisely calibrate its description of what behaviors are a reflection of EEA adaptations and what behaviors are not.)

1. Even when following his worst evo-psych instincts, Dawkins clearly doesn’t believe that arguing against X is pointless. That’s why he writes books. He’s clearly not a simple determinist.

2. Lots of beliefs are sociohistorically embedded. Some of them are also false. Pointing that out is a perfectly legitimate activity. I’m pretty sure you’ve done it as well. As for his book-publishing being a program equivalent to overthrowing the state, well, this accusation is a step up from your previous claim – that Dawkins secretly harbors Wellsian dreams of mass murder – but not by much. You do realize that aside from the less obvious Modernist dreams that you accuse him of (you’re too much of an internet pro to fall into that trap), this is pure Jonah Goldberg, don’t you?

3. Dawkins very explicitly addresses the functional claim that religion, even if false, makes us a better person. He takes the question very seriously and answers it at great length. Personally I would think an exasperated sigh and a direction to open a history book to a random page and start reading would suffice, but there you go.

4. But they all make truth claims that are false. If they make no truth claims, the Dawkins explicitly excludes them from his critique (he’s pretty clear about this, but it’s clear from this and previous posts that you haven’t read his book.)

5. But again, they aren’t true.

6. Dawkins doesn’t make this claim. His list of the sins of religion was made to counter a similar claim – that religion, even if false, is morally advantageous. Again, try reading what he’s written. That said, *I’ll* make this claim. I’m pretty sure christianity had something to do with the crusades. Or maybe you could let us all know what is the secular reason for witch-burning?

7. Dawkins isn’t interested in meaning. It’s when you start making factual claims that Dawkins objects.

1) arguably an integral part of why religion is adapted to human psychology or sociality
2) arguably an integral part of the sociohistorical embeddness of religion
3) arguably part of how religion achieves its functional utility (e.g., a necessary part of mobilizing rhetoric or a necessary part of religion constructing its ‘right’ to act within community, etc.)
4) part of what religion does within local or personal practices as well as what it does institutionally

If you follow 6), then religious truth claims aren’t an important part of actions commonly attributed to religion. For example, you could look at the conflict over evolution in the U.S. and say, “Look, religious truth claims are just the rhetorical gloss on top: what this is REALLY about is social struggle between an educated meritocracy and working-class communities which have been excluded from certain kinds of economic or social opportunity”.

And if you follow 7), while the conventional truth claims of organized religion are subject to criticism, spiritual or religious thought still has some kind of truth to offer which is at least orthagonal to or distinctive from scientific truth.

So this really doesn’t get Dawkins et al out of trouble at all, because it’s not clear that you can just magically subtract truth claims from religion and retain whatever functions or aspects of religion that Dawkins et al would concede to be legitimate or harmless.