On one salient level, there is a two “nation” surrogate war going on in Iraq – the Shi’a nation (primarily Iran) and the Sunni nation (primarily Saudi Arabia). We have barely impeded this conflict. I propose that, if we leave, the two nations will be more exposed and may well decide that some negotiated settlement might be useful.

In particular the Saudis know (since the US DOEnergy web site describes estimates dating to the late 1990s) that the western quarter of Iraq probably has untouched oil reserves on the order of the original Saudi oil patch. My guess is that soon they will want to be part-owners (with their Sunni brethren) of this trove of black gold under relatively peaceful conditions. I guess that Iran will be quite content to see their Shi’a brethren in control of the southern fields, plus the most direct pipeline to the port.

Without the presence of the U.S. heathens, the actual religious extremists should have less to motivate them. So – all in all, I will predict less violence in our absence than in our presence.

The one caveat in my scenario will be the situation of the Kurds. Maybe – just maybe – a partial redeployment of U.S. troops to their homeland might be justified and useful. On the other hand, the Turks ain’t gonna like it. On the other hand (love me, I’m a liberal), that would be a war of two standing armies, and I think that the U.S. can handle that one.

In all of this guesstimating, though, there needs to be one particular action. The U.S. must go to some fairly large segment of the international community – preferably the U.N. – and say three things:
1) We screwed up;
2) The oil belongs to the Iraqis – or to the peoples of the resultant pieces of the former Iraq; and
3) What are your suggestions for solving the set of problems that exist in Iraq due to its past history and to our horrific blunders?

In his latest comment, withywindle speaks of a preemptive attack on Iran. I am unaware of any actions by Iran that would indicate they are about to attack the United States. Absent such an evidence, an attack on Iran would be an act of preventive war, a war of choice, and not preemptive.

I also find it amusing that one of his reasons for fearing Saddam was the Iran-Iraq war, given that Saddam was essentially acting as our proxy in that conflict.

However, prudentialism doesn’t answer my question, which was specifically about the occupation aspect. Hussein is dead, his party is essetially outlawed, and his sect is a minority in the “government”. What’s our excuse for occupation?

Of course, it is control of the oil resource. I suppose that is “prudential” to some, but it is hardly moral, ethical, or legal.

And, no, Iraq’s record of instability and aggression was actually worse than the rival states. All fatal threats, but Iran and North Korea have actually acted with relative restraint in the international arena compared with Hussein’s Iraq–which attacked two of its neighbors with massive armed force in only ten years! Iran and North Korea are nasty enough, but they haven’t done that.

If it’s a prudential case that determines when one of the many legitimate “casus belli” trips into actual war, then you add up that prudentialism in a markedly odd way. It’s as if you’re keeping a balance sheet that includes only assets and never costs, setting a trigger figure for assets, and whenever the count of assets goes over the trigger, you go to war.

But let pictures speak a thousand words. I’m curious what avid supporters of the Iraq war make of this video clip. The obvious, unremarkable explanation is that Cheney is willing to support the argument of whomever the President at the time might be. But hearing him say this clearly then–well, if he’d been a liberal at the time, surely American conservatives would already have pilloried him as weak, vacillating, supportive-of-Hussein, and so on. (Of course, he WAS supportive of Hussein, as our government was, but that too somehow doesn’t seem to feature in the memory of the Hitchens-Berman-Ignatieff crowd.)